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The PhD thesis is composed of three chapters and discusses the policy choice under
uncertainty and learning in the context of climate change.
The rst chapter surveys the existing literatures, from both theoretical and empirical
perspectives, about how uncertainty impacts the policy decision to deal with climate change.
Various sources of uncertainty exist in the climate-economy reaction with changing climate.
Among them, the impact uncertainty is the focal point of this survey. Theoretical studies
indicate that basically the uncertain and irreversible outcome implies an earlier and am-
bitious mitigation strategy. But the sunk cost of policy implementation might delay and
weaken this action. When adaptation is added into the policy portfolio, the irreversibility
constraint is relaxed and it implies less mitigation e¤ort. If another form of climate impact
is considered, the discontinuous outcome with low probability but higher damage, theoret-
ical studies show that it is optimal to enhance both mitigation e¤ort and adaptive action.
The empirical studies follow the integrated approach to link climate and economy, and in-
corporate uncertainty in several ways. With regards to the role of uncertainty, empirical
studies indicate that more mitigation is in need considering the uncertain impact of climate
change, and it is worthwhile to gain more information to reduce uncertainty.
The second chapter studies the policy balance between mitigation and adaptation under
two sources of uncertainty. It enriches the rapidly expanding literature trying to devise nor-
mative indications on the optimal combination of the two introducing the role of catastrophic
and spatial uncertainty related to climate change damages. Applying a modied version of
the NordhausRegional Dynamic Integrated Model of Climate and the Economy it is shown
that in both cases uncertainty works in the direction to make mitigation a more attractive
strategy than adaptation. When catastrophic uncertainty is concerned mitigation becomes
relatively more important as, by curbing emissions, it helps to reduce temperature increase
and hence the probability of the occurrence of the event. Adaptation on the contrary has
no impact on this. It is also shown that optimal mitigation responses are much less sensitive
than adaptation responses to spatial uncertainty. Mitigation responds to global damages,
while adaptation to local damages. The rst, being aggregated, change less than the sec-
2ond in the presence of spatial uncertainty as higher expected losses in some regions are
compensated by lower expected losses in other. Accordingly, mitigation changes less than
adaptation. Thus if it cannot be really claimed that spatial uncertainty increases the weight
of mitigation respect to that of adaptation, however its presence makes mitigation a safer
or more robust strategy to a policy decision maker than adaptation.
The third chapter explores the e¤ect of learning on climate policies. The possible reduc-
tion of uncertainty imposes e¤ects on the policy implementation. Groups of papers have
been studying passive learning, i.e. reducing uncertainty through the observation of relevant
outcomes and then updating knowledge accordingly, and its role in policy choice. However,
theoretically speaking it is also possible to learn in an active way, that is, to reduce uncer-
tainty by investing in the learning activities. So far active learning has not well-explored
by the literatures. This chapter lls the gap between the theoretical possibility and the
modeling exercise regarding active learning. We stick to the uncertainty of catastrophic
happening and try to nd the e¤ect of learning catastrophic sensitivity (a parameter bridg-
ing temperature increase and occurrence of catastrophes) on policy decision. A two-stage
sequential learning module is added to the modied version of RICE to approximate the
policy making process with the knowledge updating, which is achieved by the investment in
learning activities. The modeling exercise shows although it crowds out other investment
option, the learning investment is worthwhile in improving knowledge and controlling cli-
mate damage by choosing more benecial policies. The e¤ect on policy decision is inuenced
by the productivity of learning, i.e. learning rate. A higher learning rate implies an earlier
arrival of information, thus more quickly the policy choice approaches to the optimal.
Chapter 1
CLIMATE POLICY AND UNCERTAINTY: A LITERATURE SURVEY
Abstract
Uncertainty is one of the most important features of climate change issue. It plays sig-
nicant role in climate policies. This chapter surveys the existing literatures, from both
theoretical and empirical perspectives, about how uncertainty impacts the policy decision
to deal with climate change. Various sources of uncertainty exist in the climate-economy
reaction with changing climate. Among them, the impact uncertainty is the focal point
of this survey. Theoretical studies indicate that basically the uncertain and irreversible
outcome implies an earlier and ambitious mitigation strategy. But the sunk cost of pol-
icy implementation might delay and weaken this action. When adaptation is added into
the policy portfolio, the irreversibility constraint is relaxed and it implies less mitigation
e¤ort. If another form of climate impact is considered, the discontinuous outcome with low
probability but higher damage, theoretical studies show that it is optimal to enhance both
mitigation e¤ort and adaptive action. The empirical studies follow the integrated approach
to link climate and economy, and incorporate uncertainty in several ways. With regards to
the role of uncertainty, empirical studies indicate that more mitigation is in need considering
the uncertain impact of climate change, and it is worthwhile to gain more information to
reduce uncertainty.
41.1 Introduction
In the form of radiation the Sun delivers energy to the Earth. 30% of the radiation is reected
by the Earth while the remaining is absorbed by the land, atmosphere and ocean. In 1824
Joseph Fourier discovered that some types of gases in the atmosphere capture the thermal
infrared radiation emitted by the surface of the Earth. The thermal infrared radiation
captured by the atmosphere in turn radiates back again to the surface of the Earth. In this
way a proportion of the heat is kept between the atmosphere and the Earth surface. These
certain types of gases in the atmosphere are referred to as greenhouse gases (GHG). The
greenhouse e¤ect, featured by the forward-and-back radiation between the surface of the
Earth and the atmosphere, is the reason for the Earth to keep itself within the reasonable
range of temperature for all the creatures that live on it.
However, the greenhouse e¤ect has been enhancing since the mid 20th century. Hu-
man activities, primarily fossil fuel use or deforestation, are important attributes to the
increasing concentration of GHG in the atmosphere (IPCC AR4, 2007). The process has
been increasing the average temperature of the Earths lower atmosphere: in the last 100
years the temperature has increased by 0:74 0:18C and it will continue to rise by 1:1 to
6:4C during the 21st century (IPCC AR4, 2007). The temperature increase brings about
a wide range of e¤ects on the climate-economy system with the potential to induce sever
harm to societieswelfare and threats of huge economic losses: sea level rise, the change of
precipitation pattern, Arctic shrinkage, rainforest shrinkage, the increase of the intensity of
extreme climate events, species extinctions, etc..
Since 1992, with the establishment of the UNFCCC, the international community has
launched mitigation actions to stabilize the GHG concentration at levels that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Since the seventh Conference
of Parties (COP-7) in Marrakech in 2001, policy makers also have begun to administer a
variety of strategies to adapt to those climate impacts. The policy-making process however
is complicated by various sources of uncertainties, including: incomplete knowledge of the
functioning of the climate system and of its sensitivity to human action; of the reactions of
environmental systems to climatic changes (when, where, with which intensity impacts hit);
5of the reactions of social economic systems to climatic and environmental changes. Given
its pervasive role, uncertainty is one of the fundamental factors to be incorporated in the
policy decisions on climate change policies.
This survey, aimed at investigating the existing literature in the context of climate
change, will focus on the role of uncertainty in climate change issue and the treatment
of it in the policy study. Section 2 describes various sources of uncertainty categorized
by the literatures. Section 3 surveys the theoretical approach of studying uncertainty and
summarizes the main ndings. Section 4 covers the empirical studies, with special attention
to the integrated assessment framework. Section 5 provides conclusions regarding the survey
and the expectations of the upcoming studies.
1.2 Di¤erent Sources of Uncertainty in Policy Assessment
Figure 1.1: Climate-Economy Reaction of Climate Chang Issue
Uncertainty extensively exists in the climate-economy reaction chain of climate change
phenomenon (Fig.1.1). It can be roughly categorized into three classes (Heal and Kriström,
2002) in di¤erent stages of the reaction chain, denoted by di¤erent colours in Fig.1.1. The
rst class is the scientic uncertainty, answering the question what will the climate be?
Scientic uncertainty describes relations between emissions, temperature increases, and cli-
matic and environmental responses, including the particular categories of catastrophic and
irreversible events. It refers to the imperfect knowledge about the causal e¤ect of anthro-
pogenic emission on climate change, for example, the response of carbon cycle to emis-
sion (Webster et al., 2003; ONeill and Melnikov, 2008); the climate sensitivity to GHG
6concentration (Kelly and Kolstad, 1999a; Oppenheimer et al., 2008) or the occurrence of
catastrophic event due to temperature increase (Tsur and Zemel, 1996; Bosello and Moretto,
1999; Weitzman, 2009). The second class is the impact uncertainty, answering the question
what does any climate change mean in natural and economic terms?Impact uncertainty
describes the relation between environmental impacts and sociental impacts, and the eco-
nomic quantication of these impacts. What and how impact is induced depend on the
stock e¤ect of GHG (Kolstad, 1996a, 1996b) and on the feature of the social-economic sys-
tem like economic and population growth (Kelly and Kolstad, 2001; Nordhaus and Popp,
1997), degree of social risk-aversion (Gollier et al., 2000; Ingham et al., 2007), social prefer-
ence (Ayong Le Kama and Schubert, 2004), inter-regional correlation (Ulph and Maddison,
1997). The third class is the policy uncertainty, answering the question what is the optimal
policy response to the likely impacts?Policy uncertainty relates to uncertain cost-benets /
cost-e¤ectiveness of climate change mitigation and adaptation policies. The rst on its turn
connected to the uncertain feedback of the economic system to the climate system through
policy driven changes in emission regimes (Kolstad 1996c), institutional limits (Toman,
2003), and technical improvement (Dowlatabadi, 1998; Bosetti et al., 2008).
1.3 Theoretical Studies
The theoretical studies on uncertainty in the context of climate change mainly discuss the
e¤ect of irreversibility and the possibility of learning on the policy choice. The main topic
developed by the literatures is the role played by uncertainty on climate impact. Within
this stream, a subset of studies tackled high damage-low probability events (catastrophes)
(Posner, 2004). Initially, these studies focused on mitigation, the strategy that by control-
ling the carbon emission reduces the anthropogenic interference over the climate system.
Literatures try to nd out how uncertainty, irreverisibility and learning a¤ect the mitiga-
tion strategy and the timing of its implementation. More recently, adaptation has been
added. It cannot slow down the warming process, but helps the social-economic systems to
reduce the adverse impacts and enhance the possible benecial inuence. While the society
protects itself from the risk of climate change by both mitigation and adaptation, how to
7balance the two when uncertainty is confronted becomes a new concern. From mitigation
alone to the joint implementation of mitigation and adaptation, literatures provide insights
on the role of uncertainty in climate policy decision.
1.3.1 Methodological Approaches
Two approaches diversify the research on the impact uncertainty. The rst concentrates
on impacts as partly unpredictable outcomes to be dealt with standard tools. The second
considers the uncertainty originated by possible high damage low-probability climatic events.
In either case, irreversibility is at the core of investigation. It refers to the loss of an option in
the future due to the activity at present. The loss can be absolute or theoretically possible,
but in practice not because of the extremely high cost of the correction (Arrow and Fisher,
1974).
In general, the theoretical studies parameterize uncertainty from a probability space and
formulate a multi-period utility maximization problem under the constraint of irreversibil-
ity. Utility in the later period depends on the realization of the uncertain parameter at
certain point before. Uncertainty, irreversibility, and the possible reduction of uncertainty
 in a more widely-used term, learning are integrated by this means in one theoretical
framework. This basic approach is inherited from the most pioneering works on uncertainty
and irreversibility (Arrow and Fisher, 1974; Henry, 1974; Freixas and La¤ont, 1984). It was
applied to environmental policies rst and to the climate change issue after. Two kinds of
irreversibility are usually compared climate irreversibility and economic irreversibil-
ity. These two terms refer to the impossibility to emit negative amount of GHG in the
future (climate irreversibility) or to withdraw the investment that has already been made
previously (economic irreversibility) (Kolstad, 1996a). The two constraints are contrasted
under di¤erent assumptions and model settings, which o¤er a wide range of results (Ulph
and Ulph, 1997; Gollier et al. 2000; Pindyck, 2000, 2002; Fisher and Narain, 2003 etc.).
81.3.2 Findings in Theoretical Literatures
The two basic questions the theoretical studies are trying to answer are: in the presence of
uncertainty should the policy be more cautious or not? Should the policy be adopted right
now or later?
In the more general case, there are two distinct points of view. The rst states that
if the uncertain outcome of certain action is irreversible, the possibility of getting better
information in the future about the future benet/cost of current action leads to a more
cautious action, that is more ambitious preventive action (Arrow and Fisher, 1974; Henry,
1974; Freixas and La¤ont, 1984; Ulph and Ulph, 1997); if the uncertainty is big, the policy
should be adopted earlier (Saphores, 2004). Put into the context of climate change, this
viewpoint implies that if climate change induces irreversible damages, it is better to adopt
more ambitious mitigation policy if better information is expected about the damage than
if no information can be expected. However taking also economic irreversibility into con-
sideration these result can vary according to di¤erent assumptions and model settings. In
general the policy can be less stringent because when opportunity cost of the mitigation
investment and stocks (e.g. energy saving, R&D investment for backstop technologies etc.)
grow over time, it can be wiser to wait for more accurate information about climate damage
and then implement the optimal policy. In terms of timing, the delayed action would be
optimal under some very particular conditions1 (Gollier et al.,2000; Fisher, 2001; Pindyck,
2000, 2002; Fisher and Narain, 2002). In all, the combined e¤ect of irreversibility and learn-
ing on the current mitigation policy is ambiguous. But if adaptation is added into the policy
portfolio, even if facing the irreversible outcome, mitigation policy becomes less urgent and
can be adopted later (Ingham et al. , 2007). It is because in their model settings, adaptation
acts to weaken the e¤ect of irreversibility, hence the possibility to gain information in the
future makes current inaction worthwhile.
When the uncertain catastrophic damages are involved, especially if irreversible, it is
intuitive to expect a more ambitious emission control policy to reduce the risk (Clarke and
1The technical detail of these conditions goes beyond the scope of this survey. The interested reader is
addressed directly to Fisher (2001) and Fisher and Narain (2002) .
9Reed, 1994, Baranzini, 2003; Ingham et al., 2005, 2007), and also more adaptive action
to either prepare for or deal with the potential damages (Ingham et al., 2005). Theoreti-
cally, a certain interval of emission level could be considered safewithout triggering the
catastrophic event; beyond the interval the controlling policy should be adopted (Tsur and
Zemel, 1996). If the catastrophic damage is irreversible, the risk also calls for the earlier
actions (Ingham et al., 2007). However some authors showed that counter-intuitive results
are possible: a reversible catastrophic outcome will result in the more ambitious policy than
the irreversible event (Tsur and Zemel, 1998). This is due to the very specic modeling of
the policy cost in that paper it assumed that the penalty value, calculated as the value
forgone because of irreversible event, will decrease with the emission level.
When mitigation and adaptation work together to deal with uncertain catastrophic
events, the two strategies are substitute in the sense that increasing the usage of one strategy
reduces another (Ingham et al., 2005). Therefore, the conclusion drawn in the same paper
about the e¤ect of catastrophic happening on either policies, which is also mentioned above,
encounters a challenge. They stated that the uncertain catastrophic events calls for more
e¤ort of both mitigation and adaptation. However, the two strategies do not necessarily
take the same e¤ect in dealing with catastrophic damages. It is more probable that when
facing the uncertainty of catastrophic events, one strategy is more benecial than another
since the two function in di¤erent ways. If so, due to the substitution between the two,
intuitively it is also possible to enhance the more benecial strategy while use less another.
In Appendix A, a simple static model is developed to elaborate this point. So far, the
discussion about the policy trade-o¤ between mitigation and adaptation in the presence of
catastrophic events is still very rare.
Uncertainty can a¤ect the policy mix between mitigation and adaptation also outside
the area of catastrophic events. For example, Kane and Shogren (2000) studied both the
impact uncertainty and the policy uncertainty the e¤ectiveness of both strategies. They
emphasize the cross e¤ect of the two when uncertainty is present. They conclude that
whether the climate risk increase or decrease the investment on either strategy depends
on whether and to what extent the two strategies enhance or weaken the productivity of
each other. Lecoq and Shalizi (2007) studied the uncertainty of the geographic distribution
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of climatic damages. They consider the di¤erent function of mitigation and adaptation
in the di¤erent scope, that mitigation is a global public good while adaptation functions
to reduce the local damage. They suggest that when facing the uncertain distribution of
climatic damages, the cost-e¤ectiveness of mitigation is enhanced with respect to that of
adaptation, and the need for mitigation should be strengthened.
1.4 Empirical Studies
In the context of climate change the dominant approach to conduct empirical investigation
is Integrated Assessment (IA). IA models (IAM) link the economic and scientic aspects
of climate change. This approach, applied to climate change issue, was rstly followed by
the study on the optimal emission path (i.e. mitigation). Only recently has adaptation
been incorporated into the framework. IAM is not necessarily belonging to the top-down
modeling family, although for some cases, the optimal policy path is derived in a general
equilibrium perspective.
1.4.1 Methodological Approaches
Earlier IAM built up the general framework to balance the emission reduction costs against
the benet in terms of the damage reduction (e.g. Manne and Richels, 1992; Peck and
Teisberg, 1992; Hope et al., 1993; Nordhaus, 1993, 1994; Manne et al., 1995; Nordhaus
and Yang, 1996). Adaptation is added later as another strategy to reduce the climate
damage (De Bruin et al., 2009; Bosello, 2010; Bosello et al., 2010) This framework can be
simplied by Fig.1.2. It illustrates the logic underneath the cost-benet tradeo¤ of climate
policies: mitigation and adaptation take up resources from the economic system at the cost
of social production. Mitigation curbs the GHG emission and thus reduces the damages
while adaptation acts directly on damage reduction. These models try to solve an inter-
temporal welfare-maximization problem with the aim of either searching for or evaluating
the climate policies (Kelly and Kolstad, 1999b ).
Despite the common logic and the similar general framework, signicant variation exists
among groups of IAM cited above, regarding the level of climatic and economic complexity.
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To link the climaticeconomic system and the policy intervention, typical IAMs have several
crucial components that make the policy study possible: climatic model, damage function,
and modeling the policy costs.
Figure 1.2: Integrated Assessment Modeling
From the perspective of economic modelers, to formulize reasonable damage functions
and policy cost functions is no doubt the major challenge to describe how economic system
responds; the development of the climate module, on the other hand, is not the main task of
economic analyses, but incorporating a more precise geophysical submodel is still a precious
contribution.
The rst crucial component of IAM, damage function, is included into the IAM frame-
work by two means. One is in a reduced form simply linking temperature increase to GDP
losses (Peck and Teisberg, 1992; Bosello, 2010) and another adopts the specic function
for the assessment of specic damage categories (e.g. Nordhaus, 1990; Dowlatabadi and
Morgan, 1993; Hope et al., 1993; Tol and Verheyen, 2004). The classication of di¤er-
ent damages varies based on the research topic. Di¤erent damage categories are treated
separately, for example by Bosello et al.(2006) who estimated the climate-change impacts
on human health; by (Bosello et al., 2007) on sea-level rise; by (Roson et al. , 2007) on
energy demand; by (Bigano et al. , 2006) on sea-level rise and tourism; by (Cisar, 2009)
on sea-level rise, agriculture, tourism, river oods; by (Wei & Aaheim, 2010) on sea-level
rise, agriculture, health, energy demand, tourism, forestry, sheries, extreme events, energy
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supply, etc. All these studies model the sectoral details to allows the specication of climate
change impact e¤ects for the di¤erent sectors.
Adaptation itself is a component of the climate change damages function as it contributes
to build up total climate change costs. Indeed in IAM the damage functions usually include
the adaptation cost, but without being able to disentangle it from the residual damage.
Therefore, in most of the studies of adaptation, it is not really treated as a policy decision
variable. The calibration of adaptation costs and benets become more uncertain in this
sense. The few exceptions, like De Bruin et al., (2009) and Bosello (2010) develop only
recently. With this distinction, two ways to represent the cost of adaptation is either as
part of the production (Bosello, 2010) or as a component of imposed cost (Fankhauser,
1998), either exogenous (Hope et al. , 1993) or endogenous (De Bruin et al. , 2009).
The policy cost of mitigation, on the other hand, is usually modeled explicitly by for-
mulating energy using pattern, research and development activities, technical progress and
ranges of emission scenarios. Early IAMs constructed two approaches to model mitigation
cost, depending on the structure of the framework. If the model incorporates energy sectors,
where GHG emission is induced and where the technical progress takes place, in general the
mitigation cost is decided by the activities in the energy sector (Peck and Teisberg, 1992;
Dowlatabadi and Morgan, 1993; Manne et al., 1995). Otherwise mitigation cost is simplied
as a proportion of the gross production, which is fair enough to delegate the aggregated cost
no matter what specic sources are (Nordhaus, 1993; Nordhaus and Yang, 1996). IAMs
nowadays, which have been developing in the latest decade, usually follow the rst way,
since there are emerging important technological developments that could fundamentally
alter mitigation strategies. Integrated assessment modelers have developed more complete
framework and added into those frameworks more factors that impact the mitigation cost
(e.g. Manne and Richels, 2005; Bosetti, et al., 2006; Bouwman et al., 2006; Tol, 2009;
Calvin et al., 2009).
About the climatic module, from CETA (Peck & Teisberg, 1992) that built up a sim-
ple one-parameter mapping from GHG concentration to the atmospheric temperature, to
RICE-2010 (Nordhaus, 2010) that includes carefully-calibrated equation series describing
heat transfer in a three-layer climatic system, most of IAMs now use relatively enriched
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description of carbon cycle - ocean atmospheric interactions.
With the damage function, policy cost and climatic module, IAM can be used to incor-
porate uncertainty in an interactive climate-economy environment.
In the large-scale energy-economic policy models, incorporating uncertainty should in
principle bring about outcomes with these four aspects (Kann and Weyant, 2000): probabil-
ity weighted output value; optimal decision in light of the imperfect knowledge; a measure
of risk or dispersion of the outcome; and the information value of the key parameters. There
are di¤erent approaches to get these information (Peterson, 2006). (1) Sensitivity analysis
of the unknown / uncertain parameters which is a simple yet insightful way to test how the
outputs vary because of the uncertain inputs (Nordhaus, 1994; Weyant et al., 1996; Kelly
and Kolstad, 1999b), and the comparison of the outputs under the true and false knowledge
helps to get the value of the information (Manne and Richels, 1992; Peck and Teisberg,
1993); (2) uncertainty propagation, which refers to mapping the uncertainty of inputs to
the probability distribution of the outputs (Nordhaus and Popp, 1997) or taking the ex-
pectation of the output (Bosello and Moretto, 1999); (3) sequential decision-making under
uncertainty, which introduces the possibility of reducing uncertainty, i.e. learning. Di¤erent
modeling skills are applied according to di¤erent types of learning passive learning and
active learning2. In passive learning, which has been so far the main approach followed by
the existing literature, uncertainty is being reduced through the observation of the relevant
outcomes. Bayesian learning is a well used and typical example of the autonomous reduc-
tion of uncertainty (Kelly and Kolstad, 1999a; Karp and Zhang, 2001; Leach 2007; Webster
et al., 2008). By contrary, to our knowledge, so far there has not yet been any empirical
studies on active learning, where the reduction of the uncertainty is achieved by investing
in research and development (R&D). Nevertheless, the literatures about the e¤ect of R&D
on productivity improvement and cost reduction can provide some insights for the modeling
of active learning in the upcoming studies.
The results of policy studies incorporating uncertainty depend on what specic source
2The terminology here is a bit di¤erent from Kolstad (1996c). Here we will not consider about the
autonomous learning which refers to the reduction of uncertainty merely through the passage of time.
Passive learning referred here equals to the active learning there while active learning equals to the
purchased learning.
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of uncertainty the study is taking care of. Generally speaking, however, the empirical
literature so far conrmed the theoretical nding that imperfect knowledge implies more
stringent policy to keep the system away from climatic damages (Nordhaus and Popp, 1997)
while the possibility of learning, especially the autonomous learning, causes the trade-o¤
between the benet of the climate policy and the information (Kelly and Kolstad, 1999a).
The three approaches to quantify uncertainty will be discussed in detail in the following,
and the summary of the approaches, the methodologies and the selected ndings are listed
in Table B in Appendix.
Sensitivity analysis can deal with wide range of sources of uncertainty, as long as the
sources can be parameterized in the IAM sub-models. There are two purposes of sensitivity
analysis: to get the most relevant uncertainty and to estimate the information value. The
rst purpose can be fullled through analyzing the sensitivity of the output to uncertain
parameters (Nordhaus, 1994) and calculating the correlation index between uncertainty
and output (Hope et al., 1993)3. The estimation of the information value can be done by
comparing the outputs under imperfect information and the true state and then drawing the
information index like EVPI (Expected Value of Perfect Information) (Peck and Teisberg,
1993), EVDI (Expected Value of Dynamic Information) (Bosello and Moretto, 1999) and
so forth.
Uncertainty propagation can also deal with variety of uncertainties. Monte-Carlo simu-
lation could be carried out to deliverthe uncertainty from inputs to outputs (Tol, 1999).
Apart from the uncertain parameters, this approach can also incorporate the uncer-
tain events through the expected output weighted by the event probability (Bosello and
Moretto, 1998; Castelnuovo et al., 2003).
Sequential decision making is the most demanding approach compared with the other
two. Modeling complexity is greatly increased thus a relatively small pool of uncertainties
so far has been studied following this approach. Active learning is not a common topic,
but a group of models that incorporate the growth and cost reduction driven by technical
progress can provide the insight for the foreseen studies (Nordhaus, 2002; Zwaan et al.,
3 see Peterson (2006) for detail.
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2002; Popp, 2004; Alberth and Hope, 2007; Bosetti et al., 2008). Passive learning has re-
ceived more attention. The most popular investigation method in the eld so far is Bayesian
learning. Policy makers update their knowledge of some uncertain parameters (or the vari-
ability) through some observable variables, building up a learning module to describe the
relationship between the observation and the uncertain parameter, and incorporating this
relationship into the IAM framework. A typical example is learning the climate sensitivity
(CS), which contributes to the mapping from GHG concentration to temperature increase
(e.g. Kelly and Kolstad, 1999; Keller et al., 2004; Oppenheimer et al., 2008; Webster et al.,
2008). They treat CS as a random variable that has a prior at 0th period, the posterior
could keep on being updated at the end of each consecutive period by the observation of
temperature and GHG concentrations. Following this approach, policy makers can also esti-
mate the time that is needed to get close to the true knowledge (Kelly and Kolstad, 1999a).
Although Bayesian learning has now become a widely used approach, it is well worth men-
tioning several shortcomings of it. First of all, it could be a good way to treat a univariate
case where there is only one source of uncertainty for each run, nevertheless signicant er-
rors might occur in the bivariate case. For example, if two parameters in the temperature
function are uncertain, to learn both of them through the single set of observation is proven
to be misled; after all, for example, the observation of temperature represents only a single
draw from a complicated system about which we have limited knowledge (Leach, 2007).
Secondly, introducing variability in Bayesian learning is a must, without which the learning
becomes a one shot thing because the uncertain parameter can be easily derived after
the rst observation. However, take CS again for an example, with variability, the learning
process becomes "noisier". The noise can be reduced through more emission to reveal more
information. Therefore, to control emission and to acquire more information constitutes a
pair of trade-o¤s (Kelly and Kolstad, 1999a). How to deal with these trade-o¤s has been
discussed yet. The only thing we can say now is that Bayesian learning, at least in this con-
text, makes things more complicated. Hence the work so far is still far away from reaching
a functional conclusion.
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1.4.2 Findings of Empirical Studies
The results from IAM exercises answer the same question raised for theoretical studies: in
the presence of uncertainty how much the action should be taken? What is the appropriate
time to take the action? Selected ndings are included in Table B. The results for di¤erent
topics are di¢ cult to be compared. In general, the most intuitive and common conclusion is
consistent with the theoretical results. With uncertainty, climate policies are more stringent
to keep the society from the risks. The value of information is usually positive and able to
justify the worth of getting correct information. But with learning, especially by passive
learning, a less stringent policy might be needed to acquire more accurate information,
(Webster et al., 2008) although by some numerical results they should only only be slightly
less stringent and the action should not be delayed (Karp and Zhang, 2001).
The uncertainty of catastrophic event causes a higher mitigation rate (e.g. Bosello
and Moretto, 1998) and earlier preventive action if mitigation is with low cost and the
time horizon is shorter (Guillerminet and Tol, 2008). Recently, however, a question was
raised about the outcome of catastrophic event. Dismal Theorem (Weitzman, 2009) is
a central argument stating that a fat-tail of the probability density function (PDF) of
certain key parameter for example, CS indicates that the occurrence of catastrophes at
the end part of the PDF does not decline exponentially but in a slower polynomial way.
Therefore, the present cost of future catastrophic uncertainty might be innitely large even
if social preference rate is still applied. The economic consequences of fat tailed structural
uncertainty can readily outweigh the e¤ects of discounting in climate-change policy analysis
(Weitzman, 2009). One of the outcomes of Dismal Theorem is the doubt about the CBA
we are now using. Weitzman suggested that it is better to treat this structure uncertainty
well rather than simply remove or truncate the end part of the PDF. Although he did not
suggest an approach that could be more precise, he did point out something essential about
the catastrophic climatic event and the possible incapacity of standard CBA for it.
The empirical study on uncertainty, however, so far has not been incorporated with
the study on policy trade-o¤ between mitigation and adaptation, which by itself is also
a very recent topic. A volume of theoretical literatures, albeit still thin, give a hint that
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uncertainty takes e¤ect on the policy balance between the two; it is worthwhile also to
develop an empirical framework following the integrated approach to investigate the policy
choice taking into account certain sources of uncertainty.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter surveys the role of uncertainty in the policy study for the climate change
problem, following both the theoretical and the empirical approach. As one of the most
important features, uncertainty signicantly impacts the policy decision. In general, the
theoretical studies indicate that the irreversible uncertain outcome and the possibility of
getting better information in the future call for more cautious actions earlier and more am-
bitious mitigation policy. Two kinds of irreversibility climate and economy irreversibility,
however, contrast to each other and the policy choice is decided by the comparable strength
of the two. To be specic, due to the sunk cost of the investment in emission control, if
economy irreversibility prevails, the mitigation policy would be more relax and it is optimal
to implement the policy later. When adaptation is added into the policy portfolio, the irre-
versibility constraint is weakened and to do less mitigation becomes a better choice. When
the uncertainty of catastrophic happening is taken into account, both mitigation e¤ort and
adaptive actions are needed more to reduce the potential huge and discontinuous damages.
But considering about the trade-o¤ between the two, our simple model also shows that
mitigation e¤ort is enhanced in this case while adaptation is weakened.
IAM, as one of the most widely-used research tools for empirical study, so far has built
up a relatively complete framework for the climate policy study. Following the integrated
approach, climatic and economic system can be connected through the anthropogenic emis-
sion, interactive impact and the climate policies. Uncertainty is further incorporated into
this framework through three di¤erent ways: sensitivity analysis, uncertainty propagation
and sequential decision making. The third approach can further help to model the reduction
of uncertainty and to study in depth the e¤ect of learning on the policy choice. Empirical
studies so far have got diverse results regarding di¤erent sources of uncertainty. Consider-
ing about the uncertainty of catastrophic happenings, more ambitious mitigation strategy
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is usually more required.
The study on the policy trade-o¤ in the presence of uncertainty is so far an uncovered
topic for the empirical study, although theoretical works shed some light for this point.
Fig.1.3 below displays the elds with related to the policy trade-o¤ and uncertainty that
can be explored following the integrated assessment approach. Apparently there are still
great many topics in all three checked areas waiting to be studied on, but to study the
relationship between the two policies in a world subject to uncertainty would be interesting
and worthwhile.
Figure 1.3: Uncovered Area of the Existing Literatures
Chapter 2
MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION: BALANCING THE CLIMATE
POLICY UNDER UNCERTAINTY
Abstract
Nowadays, as stressed by important strategic documents like for instance the 2009 EU
White Paper on Adaptation or the recent 2009 Copenhagen Accord, it is amply recognized
that both mitigation and adaptation strategies are necessary to combat climate change. This
chapter enriches the rapidly expanding literature trying to devise normative indications on
the optimal combination of the two introducing the role of catastrophic and spatial uncer-
tainty related to climate change damages. Applying a modied version of the Nordhaus
Regional Dynamic Integrated Model of Climate and the Economy it is shown that in both
cases uncertainty works in the direction to make mitigation a more attractive strategy than
adaptation. When catastrophic uncertainty is concerned mitigation becomes relatively more
important as, by curbing emissions, it helps to reduce temperature increase and hence the
probability of the occurrence of the event. Adaptation on the contrary has no impact on this.
It is also shown that optimal mitigation responses are much less sensitive than adaptation
responses to spatial uncertainty. Mitigation responds to global damages, while adaptation
to local damages. The rst, being aggregated, change less than the second in the presence
of spatial uncertainty as higher expected losses in some regions are compensated by lower
expected losses in other. Accordingly, mitigation changes less than adaptation. Thus if
it cannot be really claimed that spatial uncertainty increases the weight of mitigation re-
spect to that of adaptation, however its presence makes mitigation a saferor more robust
strategy to a policy decision maker than adaptation.
20
2.1 Introduction and Background
When the battle against climate change started it was focused on mitigation measures.
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was signed in
1992 with the aim to stabilize GHG concentrations at a level that would prevent dan-
gerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Ten years later the role of
adaptation started to be considered fundamental as well to reduce many of the adverse
impacts of climate change and enhance benecial impacts"(IPCC TAR, 2001). It indicated
an increasing awareness that climate change could not be completely halted even with the
aggressive mitigation e¤ort  the strong inertias in the climate system will expose modern
societies to some degree of warming no matter what they do to curb emissions. Further-
more, the constant di¢ culties encountered by international climate negotiations also make
the implementation of aggressive mitigation even less optimistic, at least in the short term.
Important strategic documents, for instance the 2009 EU White Paper on Adaptation
or the recent 2009 Copenhagen Accord, recognized that both mitigation and adaptation
strategies are necessary to combat climate change. The knowledge of climate dynamics, of
the related environmental damages, on their economic relevance and of the costs of climate
change policies, especially when adaptation is involved, is still far from conclusive. However,
decisions have to be made and given the abovementioned climatic inertias they cannot be
postponed for long if they are expected to produce some results within the century. Against
this background a rapidly expanding literature is trying to devise normative indications
on the optimal combination of the two in a cost e¢ cient policy. A very recent stream of
research has been applying the Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) to analyze the optimal
policy portfolio (De Bruin, et al. 2009, 2010; Bosello 2010; Bosello et al. 2010). The robust
outcome of these studies is that mitigation and adaptation are strategic complements: the
optimal policy consists of a mixture of adaptation investments and mitigation measures,
this is also true in the short term even though mitigation will only decrease damages in
later periods as emission cuts can slow down temperature increase and the related damages
with a delay of 50   80 years. These authors also highlight the existence of a trade-o¤
between the two strategies: with the scarcity of resources, more on one means less on
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another. Moreover, successful adaptation reduces the marginal benet of mitigation and a
successful mitigation e¤ort reduces the damage to which it is necessary to adapt, although
the second e¤ect is notably weaker than the rst. Indeed mitigation, especially in the
short-medium term, lowers only slightly environmental damage stock and therefore does
little to decrease the need to adapt. In addition, in all these studies the bulk of resources
are devoted to adaptation, especially when the discount rate is high and when investment
in adaptation can build a cumulating stock of defensive infrastructures. From extant
literatures adaptation appears far more e¤ective than mitigation, especially in the short
term, to contrast climate change damages.
The investigation on climate policy is complicated by many uncertainties that surround
the climate change issue, for example, the uncertainty of climate impacts. One of the un-
certain impacts is the changes in extreme conditions that will bring about a sharp decline
of social welfare outside the coping range. The collapse of North Atlantic Thermohaline
Circulation (THC), a "runaway" greenhouse e¤ect (climate change could be much greater
and occur much faster than the common consensus indicated), the disintegration of West
Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS), are all examples of such discontinuous impact (Pearce et al.,
1996; Guillerminet and Tol, 2008). Catastrophic events are usually associated with very low
probability, but, once materialized, with great and sudden harm (Posner, 2004). This event
uncertainty(Tsur and Zemel, 1996) is expected to inuence the decision making process.
In the climate change impact literature there is indeed a consolidated research showing
that it induces higher mitigation rates (Clark and Reed, 1994; Yohe, 1996; Gjerde et al.,
1999; Bosello and Moretto, 1999; Ingham et al. 2005) and earlier action of emission control
(Baranzini et al., 2003; Guillerminet and Tol, 2008). However, the study so far on policy
combination of mitigation and adaptation excludes this kind of low-probability, extremely
damaging climatic events. They perform what Weitzman (2009) denes in a debated paper
[see also (Nordhaus, 2009)] a standardcost-benet analysis (CBA). With the presence of
event uncertainty, are mitigation and adaptation still complementary? Does the trade-o¤
still exist? Is the substitution of mitigation to adaptation weaker than the opposite? As
shown by (Weitzman, 2009) the cost of a future irreversible event in the presence of uncer-
tainty might be innite, and accordingly, also the willingness to pay to avoid the risk of it
22
can become innite. This, translated into the context of deciding how much it is worth to
mitigate or adapt, (and assuming that adapting to a catastrophe even though physically
possible can be extremely costly), would implicitly support the idea that uncertainty can
shift the burden of climate change damage reduction from adaptation to mitigation. This
analysis is not performed by Weitzman though. In fact, there is little literature so far truly
revealing the knowledge of policy combination with the presence of event uncertainty, with
the only notable exception of Ingham et al. (2005). They compound in a theoretical model
of mitigation, adaptation and the risk of catastrophic happenings. They show that event
uncertainty increases both the mitigation rate and adaptation investment while the two re-
main economic substitutes; in addition the optimal combination of the two depends on their
relative cost. However, they assume that the damage can only be reduced by adaptation,
which is incomplete because the damage linked to temperature increase can also be curbed
through mitigation, although the e¤ect is weaker and less direct than adaptation. Moreover,
in their average approach they neglect the regular damage that exists if catastrophic events
are not materialized.
Another form of damage uncertainty that can inuence the combination of mitigation
and adaptation is that of the geographical distribution of climate damages. Damages are
obviously region- and site- specic. However, even though some general regional patterns
and dynamics are well understood (for instance higher vulnerability of low than mid- and
high latitudes, identied hot spots for sea-level rise or droughts and oods risk, etc.) an exact
prediction of where and with which intensity a given impact is going to hit is not possible.
This is particularly concerning for some anticipatory adaptation practices entailing huge
and almost irreversible upfront investments. Typical examples are coastal or river hard
defenses. In these circumstances the nature of adaptation as private good comes into play.
Its benets are fully appropriated to the community that implements adaptation, but the
whole burden of a planning mistake also falls on the adapting community. Thus, in the
presence of spatial uncertainty, anticipatory adaptation could be an unattractive option.
Mitigation on the contrary is a global public good: in principle one ton of CO2 abated
benets the world as a whole irrespectively of where it is abated. When a planner decides
to mitigate she knows that the damage will be reduced independently upon the location
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where it is going to manifest. In this sense mitigation is more mistake-free than adaptation.
This issue has not received great attention. In our knowledge it has been tackled only by
Lecocq and Shalizi (2007). Developing a simple theoretical model they conclude that spatial
uncertainty enhances the importance of mitigation with regards to adaptation. The rst is
global and accordingly only marginally determined by the local dimension of climate change
damages. The second is more sector- and site- specic and thus inuenced by damage local
specicities. This is the other source of uncertainty we would like to investigate with our
applied model about the policy mix.
This chapter aims at lling the important knowledge gap in dening the e¤ective opti-
mal mix between mitigation and adaptation, their trade-o¤ and complementarities under
uncertainty. Two sources of impact uncertainty dened above are considered: event uncer-
tainty and spatial uncertainty. Both of them are incorporated into an integrated assessment
model where mitigation and adaptation are available policy choices for the decision maker.
Section 2 introduces the integrated model, the inclusion of adaptation and uncertainty and
describes the calibration process. Section 3 elaborates the results derived from the modeling
exercise. Section 4 conducts sensitivity analysis and the test of robustness. Section 5 draws
major conclusion.
2.2 Adaptation and Uncertainty Modeling
The modeling tool used here to analyze mitigation, adaptation and uncertainty is an im-
proved version of the basic Nordhaus and Yang (1996) RICE model. RICE-96 is a climate-
economic hard-linked integrated assessment tool originally designed to nd the optimal
abatement e¤ort under cooperative or non-cooperative settings, in six major geo-political
blocks: the United States (USA), Japan (JPN), the European Union (EEC), China (CHN),
the Eastern Europe and Russia (FSU), and the rest of the world (ROW). Although RICE
is a regional dynamic model, however, here we use it not for a regional quantitative ex-
ploration. Today the regionalization of IAM is much more specic than when Nordhaus
and Yang rst built up RICE; since our study will be more in the world vision, how to
regionalize becomes less relevant. Therefore, we can still follow the way RICE-96 lumps
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the countries. The economic component of RICE is a standard Ramsey-Keynes growth
model. It is linked to climate dynamics through the emission ow, by product of economic
activity, which induces temperature increase. This on its turn impacts the economic sys-
tem through a damage function translating warming into GDP losses. The model is fully
dynamic: regional (or global) decision makers maximize aggregated inter-temporal utility
from consumption to decide investment and abatement rates. This structure is enriched
including the adaptation policy option building upon Bosello (2010), then coupled in two
di¤erent experiments with event uncertainty and spatial uncertainty.
The complete structure of the model is reported in the Appendix C. Below the description
of the implementation of adaptation and of the two forms of uncertainty follows.
2.2.1 Adaptation Modeling and Calibration
Adaptation is modeled as a dedicated investment (IA), which cumulates over time subjected
to a depreciation rate (the same as physical capital).
SAD(n; t) = (1  IA)  SAD(n; t  1) + IA(n; t) (2.1)
The resulting stock of adaptation capital (SAD) reduces climate damages by decreasing
the multiplicative coe¢ cient (1  
) in the climate change damage function.

 = [1  b1(t)  b2(n)  (n; t)b3(n)]=
f1 + 1=[1 + SAD(n; t)1=2]  a1(n)  [T (t)=2:5]a2(n)g (2.2)
According to (2.2) adaptation shows decreasing marginal returns to scale by construc-
tion. Adaptation investment competes with investment in physical capital, consumption
and mitigation cost in the income budget constraint (2.3), where the mitigation cost is
implicitly included in 
; the damage function, and YG and YN are respectively the gross
production and the production net of climate bill, which is the total cost of climate change.
It is comprised of mitigation costs, adaptation investments and the residual damage.
YN (n; t) = Y G(n; t)  
 = C(n; t) + I(n; t) + IA(n; t) (2.3)
Calibrating adaptation costs and benets is however problematic. Firstly it is not clear
if the original damage function in RICE includes optimal adaptation costs. If so, this would
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require disentangling adaptation costs from that damage function as done for instance by
De Bruin et al. (2009, 2010) and Bosello et al. (2009). Even so, and this is the second
problem, estimates of climate change damages and of adaptation costs are so uncertain that,
given the present knowledge, it is very hard to justify any assumptions on the size of this
optimal adaptation. What could be done at best is to indicate some order of magnitude
(Agrawala and Fankhauser 2008; Parry et al., 2009). Thus in the present work rather
than engaging into complex calculations to extrapolate from a basically unknown damage
another unknown optimal adaptation investment, it is assumed that adaptation costs are
not included in the original damage specication of the RICE-96 model. Then the model is
allowed to dene its optimal adaptation level responding to local damages, but within some
imposed reasonable boundaries. The reference point for the denition of these boundaries
is a doubling of CO2 concentration. When this happens, following Tol et al. (1998) and De
Bruin et al. (2009) it is imposed that global adaptation expenditure ranges between 0:1%
and 0:5% of GDP, and that the e¤ectiveness of adaptation ranges between 30%   80% of
total damage.
Fig.2.1 displays the calibrated adaptation expenditure and e¤ectiveness, in which at
calibration point, 0.22% of adaptation brings about 53% damage reduction.
Figure 2.1: E¤ectiveness of Adaptation Investment
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2.2.2 Event Uncertainty Modeling and Calibration
Event uncertainty is implemented through a failure distribution function of the duration of
the climatic system i.e. the probability of the occurrence of the catastrophic event. It is de-
noted by a hazard rate which assumes a Weibull form (Kiefer 1988), a simple generalization
of the exponential distribution.
P (t) = 1  e
 
TR
T (0)
'(TE(t) TE(0)) 1dTE
(2.4)
Where TE(t) is the temperature increase relative to the pre-industrial level.
(2.4) shows that the maintenance of the atmospheric temperature at the original level.
T (0) eliminates the possibility of the occurrence of catastrophic events. Then, the higher
the temperature increase, the higher the probability. This depends upon the two parameters
and .
To keep the convexity of the hazard rate function, we assign  the value of 2.5 (Gjerde et
al. 1998). ' is calibrated in order to have a 7% probability of catastrophic happening, which
means a GDP loss equaling the 25% for a temperature increase of 3C above pre-industrial
period. In our model this happens at the end of the century. The 7% probability is an
upward revision of the 4:8% value proposed by Nordhaus (1994), in view of more recent
studies on the likelihood of catastrophic outcomes shown by Hadley Center (2005)(Tirpak
et al. , 2005) and Arnell et al. (2005). According to both the probability of climate-induced
catastrophes within this century are much higher: 30% for the shutdown of THC according
to the rst and 4% to 75% for a collapse of the Greenland ice sheet according to the second.
This suggested us to increase by roughly 50% the initial Nordhausestimate, leading us to
a still optimisticcatastrophic probability estimate of the 7%. This benchmark, however,
is still arbitrary. The parameter ' can be considered as another source of uncertainty
embedded in the big uncertainty of catastrophic happenings. The sensitivity analysis in
terms of ' will be conducted later to test the robustness of the main results displayed
below. And for the uncertainty of ' itself, an improving knowledge should be anticipated
as the research work carrying on about climate change. This kind of change of uncertainty
itself can be another dimension of the problem for the advanced exploration in the further
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studies.
Event uncertainty a¤ects decision making as the planner now maximizes an (inter-
temporal) expected utility function (2.5)
U = P (t)
nX tX
f(1 +R)10(1 t)!(n)  L(n; t) log [0:75  C(n; t)=L(n; t)]g
+(1  P (t))
nX tX
f(1 +R)10(1 t)!(n)  L(n; t) log [C(n; t)=L(n; t)]g (2.5)
In (2.5) utility is a weighted sum of its catastrophic and non catastrophic realizations,
with weights given by the probability of the catastrophic happening. Following Nordhaus
and Yang (1996), !(n) is the Negishi weight that makes sure the marginal utility of con-
sumption is equalized across the regions. Through mitigation the planner can lower the tem-
perature increase and thus the probability of the catastrophic event, but of course it costs.
In this formulation adaptation does not play any direct role in decreasing the catastrophic
probability. Neither does it play a role in decreasing the post catastrophic penalty on utility
as important as its way of decreasing the non-catastrophic damage  since the catastrophic
outcome is proportional to the production free of catastrophes (25%), which is heavily inu-
enced by adaptation measures, adaptation also functions in reducing catastrophic damage
but in a weaker way.
2.2.3 Spatial Uncertainty Modeling and Calibration
The second source of impact uncertainty considered here is spatial uncertainty. It is modeled
assuming six states of the world i (i = 6) where each region is assigned di¤erent possible
damage parameters, a1(n; t) in eqn. (2.2), denoted as a1i(n; t) in this subsection. Each re-
gion experiences one state of the world with the probability p(i). For simplicity it is assumed
that all the damage parameters are equally probable, i.e. p(i) = 1=6. A robustness test will
be conducted in the section of sensitivity analysis regarding this simplied assumption.
This replicates a situation in which the world planner (or the group of fully cooperating
regional planners) does not know exactly with which intensity climate change damages are
going to hit in di¤erent regions. Accordingly she has to maximize an expected utility which
averages across the six possible outcomes, choosing one investment in physical capital, one
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investment in adaptation and one mitigation level.
The utility function thus becomes:
U = P (i)
nX tX iX
f(1 +R)10(1 t)!(n)  L(n; t) log [Ci(n; t)=L(n; t)]g (2.6)
where p(i) = 1=6 and Ci(n; t) depends on a1i(n; t).
2.3 Results
Results for the event uncertainty are displayed and analyzed for the world as a whole even
though RICE is a regional model. The choice to focus on the global results is motivated by
their ability to convey the main messages coupled with the simplicity of exposition. Results
for the spatial uncertainty are shown by region, but still assuming full global cooperation
on climate policies. The choice of the cooperative setting is necessary to observe some
mitigation e¤ort (and thus to have the possibility to compare mitigation and adaptation
with and without uncertainty). In a non-cooperative environment the public good nature of
emission reduction and the associated free riding incentive imply an almost null abatement,
unless a possible catastrophe is imposed.
The business-as-usual (BAU) scenario chosen for the simulation is that of the no policy
A2 IPCC SRES scenario. On one hand its storyline seems more plausible, even though
rather pessimistic: it assumes the persistence of regional di¤erences and an almost neutral
technical change not too biased toward decarbonization of the economic systems. On the
other hand current GHG emission trends are closer to that of the A2 IPCC SRES scenario
than to other IPCC scenarios. Data for the benchmarking have been extracted form CIESIN
database. The GDP projections are reported in Fig.2.2.
In addition to the BAU (denoted by (i) in gures hereafter) three other scenarios are pro-
posed: mitigation adopted alone (denoted by (ii) in gures hereafter); adaptation adopted
alone (denoted by (iii) in gures hereafter); joint implementation of mitigation and adapta-
tion (denoted by (iv) in gures hereafter). The policy choice is discussed rst in a context
of event uncertainty and then of spatial uncertainty compared with the certainty case.
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Figure 2.2: Regional GDP Projections
2.3.1 Mitigation and Adaptation under Event Uncertainty
Fig.2.3 and Fig.2.4 show the e¤ect of event uncertainty on mitigation and adaptation e¤ort
respectively.
In a world absent of uncertainty, mitigation and adaptation conrm their strategic com-
plementarity: both are used in an optimal policy portfolio as the possibility to introduce;
mitigation (adaptation) does not eliminate the need to adapt (mitigate). They also conrm,
in line with the theoretical and empirical literature in the eld (Tol 2005; De Bruin et al.
2009, 2010; Bosello 2010) the existence of a trade-o¤. The presence of adaptation reduces
the need to mitigate whereas a successful mitigation reduces the amount of damage one
needs to adapt to. Moreover mitigation and adaptation compete for scarce funding, thus
more placed on one decreases the amount available to the other.
When event uncertainty is introduced it pulls up, as expected, the optimal mitigation
rate (by 51%, Fig.2.3). On the contrary adaptation investment remains almost unchanged
(Fig.2.4). Since mitigation helps to reduce the probability of catastrophic events and adap-
tations coping capacity becomes weaker when dealing with catastrophic damage than the
non-catastrophic outcomes, a catastrophic worldwould require more mitigation, but not
more adaptation. More mitigation reduces the probability of the catastrophic outcomes
(Fig.2.5) from the 7:2% to the 5:4%, which means that the temperature increase will be
curbed from 3:2C to 2:7C in 2090 (Fig.2.6).
Even in the presence of an uncertain catastrophic event a certain degree of crowding
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Figure 2.3: Mitigation Rate under Event Uncertainty
Figure 2.4: Adaptation Investment under Event Uncertainty
out of adaptation on mitigation (and vice versa) still remains. Indeed part of mitigation
e¤ort still works to reduce the regular damage component, and this action keeps on being
inuenced by adaptation activity. However, compared to the certainty case, the crowding
out of adaptation on mitigation is greatly reduced (it is 68% smaller in 2100), while that of
mitigation on adaptation is greatly amplied (114% larger in 2100). This result is quantied
also in Table 2.1 which computes the elasticity of mitigation with respect to adaptation and
vice versa. Table 2.1 shows that the elasticity of mitigation to adaptation is smaller under
uncertainty than certainty case while that of adaptation to mitigation is larger.
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Figure 2.5: Probability of Catastrophic Happenings
Figure 2.6: Temperature Increase
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This outcome highlights that in the presence of an uncertain catastrophic event, more
adaptation o¤ers a weaker incentive to reduce mitigation. Indeed even though adapta-
tion decreases the regular damage it cannot decrease the probability of the catastrophic
occurrence, which is governed by temperature increase and thus by emissions that can be
controlled only by mitigation.
Figure 2.7: Expenditure Allocation across Mitigation and Adaptation: Certainty Case
Figure 2.8: Expenditure Allocation across Mitigation and Adaptation: Uncertainty Case
This translates into a dramatically increased amount of resources devoted to mitigation
than to adaptation (comparison of Fig.2.7 and Fig.2.8) and to an evident but more moderate
increase of the percent of damage reduction due to mitigation with respect to adaptation
(comparison of Fig.2.9 and Fig.2.10). All these ndings provide a note that adaptation
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Figure 2.9: Proportion of Damage Reduction: Certainty Case
Figure 2.10: Proportion of Damage Reduction: Uncertainty Case
remains the strategy relatively more e¤ective in damage reduction. This however refers to
the non catastrophic damage component as well as the weaker yet still imposed e¤ect on
catastrophic damage. Even though uncertainty roughly increases mitigation by 50% this
typically deploys its stronger e¤ects with a delay, especially after the end of the century.
Along the 21st century adaptation is still the main damage reducer.
As an exercise it can be interesting to compare these results with the mitigation targets
currently debated in the international context. In the framework of its climate change
strategy the EU proposed a safety threshold for temperature increase of 2C with respect
to pre-industrial levels within the century (CEC 2007). This target has been iterated in the
2009 Copenhagen Accord, which also proposed a set of non-binding commitments by many
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countries ranging from explicit carbon reduction policies to carbon and energy e¢ ciency
targets. It has been estimated that if all these commitments were fullled and all the
resources potentially mobilized were devoted to mitigation the temperature increase could
be kept below 2:5C (reasonably close to the goal of 2C) (Carraro and Massetti 2010).
Our model would replicate such an outcome if, keeping the catastrophic probability at its
calibrated level (7%) the related damage would be increased to roughly the 75% of world
GDP, or conversely if, with a damage kept at its calibrated level (25%), the catastrophic
probability would be increased to 30%, for a temperature increase of 3C. These simple
estimates constitute some back of the envelope calculations revealing the implicit risk
perception of the policy decision maker that interestingly enough are close to the scientic
perception.
We nd that compared to the certainty case the event uncertainty increases the opti-
mal level of mitigation whereas the level of adaptation investment remains unchanged or
even decreases. Accordingly, as far as the relationship of the two policies is concerned, the
event uncertainty decreases the substitutability of adaptation with mitigation and increases
the appeal of mitigation. This suggests an important policy implication. In a world char-
acterized by regular climate damages mitigation is a marginal option, viable and welfare
improving if coupled with adaptation, but anyway secondary if compared with what adap-
tation can cost e¢ ciently achieve. In a world with catastrophic event uncertainty mitigation
becomes the only strategy able to reduce the probability of the catastrophic outcomes and
becomes the key policy variable. As a consequence mitigation should be decided at the
outset on the basis of precautionary considerations (and not on standard cost-benet
approach based on perfect information) and adaptation has to be deployed to tackle the
residual damage not accommodated by mitigation.
2.3.2 Mitigation and Adaptation under Spatial Uncertainty
In the presence of spatial uncertainty, the policy decision maker does not know exactly
with which intensity climate change damage can hit a given region. The implication is
an expected damage at the global level and at the regional evel which di¤er from those
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under certainty (Fig.2.11 and Fig.2.12). Di¤erences however are more pronounced in the
second than in the rst case. Indeed, when the whole world is considered, higher expected
damages in one region tend to be partially compensated by lower expected damages in
another. Accordingly, expected damage at the global level di¤ers from that under certainty
by 18% at maximum in 2100, while regional damages di¤er from the certainty case in a
range between the  36% and 52% in 2100.
Figure 2.11: Percentage Change of the Global Climatic Damage under Spatial Uncertainty
w.r.t. Certainty Case
Figure 2.12: Percentage Change in the Regional Climatic Damage under Spatial Uncertainty
w.r.t. Certainty Case
Spatial uncertainty inuences both mitigation and adaptation decisions, but the impact
on mitigation di¤ers from that on adaptation.
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Mitigation is a global public good, therefore total abatement e¤ort is driven by total
climate change damage. This e¤ort is then distributed across regions in order to equalize
marginal abatement costs, but these are not a¤ected by spatial uncertainty. The conse-
quence is that the (moderately) reduced total damage at the world level induces a roughly
uniform moderate reduction of abatement e¤ort in each region of the model (roughly  2%
see Fig.2.13). Interestingly, all regions reduce their abatement e¤ort irrespectively of the
fact that expected damages in some of these regions can increase.
Figure 2.13: Percentage Change of the Mitigation Rates under Spatial Uncertainty w.r.t.
Certainty Case
Figure 2.14: Percentage Change of the Adaptation Investments under Spatial Uncertainty
w.r.t. Certainty Case
Adaptation, on the contrary, is a private good. It tackles local damages and benets the
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region that is adapting. Thus adaptation responds much more than mitigation to changes
in regional damages. It increases when the expected damage increases and vice versa (see
Fig.2.14). More specically, expected damages are higher in FSU, USA, JPN, EEC and
lower in CHN and ROW and this is mirrored by adaptive responses. Note also that changes
in adaptation expenditure are larger than those in damages. This is the consequence of the
interaction between mitigation and adaptation: under spatial uncertainty total mitigation
e¤ort is reduced and this pushes up adaptation.
Spatial uncertainty changes the damage distribution among the regions, hence changes
the distribution of adaptation investments, which is implemented to reduce regional dam-
ages. In contrast, the expected damage at the global scale does not change as signicantly
as the regional damage, and the variation of the optimal mitigation rate is not as signicant
as that of adaptation investment.
This has also important policy implication. We cannot claim, as suggested by Lecoq
and Shalizi (2007), that spatial uncertainty increases the cost-e¤ectiveness of mitigation
respect to that of adaptation, and the need for mitigation should be strengthened. In fact,
spatial uncertainty can well increase considerably adaptation investment with respect to the
certainty case, when there is a good probability to experience higher damages. Nevertheless
we show clearly that optimal mitigation, designed to respond to global damages, is much less
sensitive to spatial uncertainty than adaptation. Under this perspective mitigation o¤ers
a saferor more robust strategy to policy makers than adaptation. In other words, in a
spatial uncertainty context a given mitigation policy can be expected to perform on average
better, or to be revised less, than a given adaptation policy. This is an additional factor
that should be considered, especially during international negotiation processes, in deciding
mitigation e¤orts that can play in favor of mitigation compared to adaptation.
2.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we are going to conduct series of sensitivity analysis to test the robustness
of the results and the sensitivity of the outputs to key parameters.
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2.4.1 Discount Rate
We used 3% as the social discount rate to weigh the welfare for di¤erent periods. It reects
our assumption that the interest of the next period is approximately 97% as important as
the interest of one period earlier. However, the determination of an ideal social discount
rate is highly debated in environmental economics for its moral implication. Here we choose
other two levels to test the e¤ect of social inter-generation unfairness on the policy choice.
Besides 3% we adopt another two with 50% higher (1:5%) and 50% lower (4:5%). We
run the model under the policy scenario with both policies jointly implemented, in the
light of event uncertainty. Because a lower social discount rate implies a higher concern for
the interest of future generations, more cautious policies are taken to protect them from
the damages. Therefore, as Fig.2.15 and Fig.2.16 show, higher mitigation rate and more
adaptation investment are the optimal choices for lower social discount rate (Bosello, 2010).
However, due to the delayed e¤ect of mitigation, the increasing rate of mitigation is higher
than adaptation to benet more the future generations. Numerically the increasing rate is
around 41% in average of mitigation comparing to 27% of adaptation. Figure.2.17 shows
the elasticity of mitigation to adaptation. The elasticity is calculated as before, using the
ratio of the changing rate of mitigation to adaptation, which is caused by the reduction of
adaptation. The sensitivity analysis tests the robustness of the results we drew before: the
negativity of the elasticity shows the substitution between the two policies. Furthermore,
since mitigation takes e¤ect later in the case of lower-discount rate, Fig.2.17 indicates that
the higher weight on future generations (lower social discount rate) makes mitigation more
responsive to the decreasing adaptation investment. However, since adaptation functions
in a shorter period, the losses caused by the reduction of adaptation investment are similar
among the cases with di¤erent social discount rate, so mitigation e¤ort should be strength-
ened also by the similar rate. As it is shown in Fig.2.17, only after 70 years the elasticity
starts to diversify.
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Figure 2.15: E¤ect of Discount Rate: Mitigation Rate under Event Uncertainty
Figure 2.16: E¤ect of Discount Rate: Adaptation Investment under Event Uncertainty
2.4.2 Probability of the Catastrophic Happenings
For the calibration of the failure distribution function, we benchmarked the probability as
7% as the temperature increases by 3C. Now we use the two extremes of the experts
opinion on this calibration point to conduct the sensitivity analysis, 4% and 75%.
Fig.2.18 and Fig.2.19 show that by higher probability of catastrophic happenings, it is
optimal to implement more both policies. It is intuitive that the more probable catastrophic
event will happen, the higher is the expected damage hence more adaptive actions are
needed (adaptation) or more cautious the policy maker should be (mitigation). Additionally,
we have already shown that mitigation does more than adaptation in the light of event
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Figure 2.17: E¤ect of Discount Rate: Elasticity of Mitigation to Adaptation under Event
Uncertainty
Figure 2.18: E¤ect of Probability: Mitigation Rate
uncertainty. Therefore, as the probability gets higher mitigation (adaptation) becomes
even more (less) important. As the same amount of adaptation investment is decreased,
less loss is induced in this case, thus less mitigation e¤ort is needed to be substitution. By
contrary, the same amount of mitigation reduction induces higher losses, so the adaptation
investment increases more as a substitution. The elasticity between the two policies in
Fig.2.20 and Fig.2.21 show the trends.
2.4.3 Damage Coe¢ cient Re-shu­ ing
When we modeled spatial uncertainty, we reshu­ ed the damage coe¢ cients among the six
regions with the equal probability i.e. the six regions had the same chance (1=6) to get the six
42
Figure 2.19: E¤ect of Probability: Adaptation Investment
Figure 2.20: E¤ect of Probability: Elasticity of Mitigation to Adaptation under Event
Uncertainty
damage coe¢ cients. Now we test the robustness of the result by assuming a di¤erent degree
of heterogeneity. The summed probability is still equal to 1. We decrease the probability of
three regions by 25% consecutively and increase the other three by 25% consecutively i.e.
three regions will be assigned the probability of [(1=6)  (1   1=4)] , [(1=6)  (1   2  1=4)]
and [(1=6)  (1  3  1=4)] while the other three get [(1=6)  (1 + 1=4)], [(1=6)  (1 + 2  1=4)]
and [(1=6)  (1+3  1=4)]. Re-running the model, we plot Fig.2.22 and Fig.2.23 accordingly.
Fig.2.22 and Fig.2.23 show the results qualitatively consistent with the one using the
equal reshu­ ing probability: regional decision on mitigation rates is irresponsive to geo-
graphic uncertainty while adaptation is quite heterogeneous among the all.
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Figure 2.21: E¤ect of Probability: Elasticity of Adaptation to Mitigation under Event
Uncertainty
Figure 2.22: Damage Coe¢ cient Re-shu­ ing: Percentage Change of the Optimal Mitigation
Rate under Spatial Uncertainty w.r.t. Certainty Case
2.5 Concluding Remarks
Mitigation and adaptation are two strategies that support the policy maker in the struggle
against climate change. While there is a broad consensus about the importance of both,
there is still a signicant knowledge gap in dening the e¤ective optimal mix between miti-
gation and adaptation, their trade o¤ and complementarities. Though a growing, albeit still
thin literature, addressed this issue using economic-climate integrated assessment models,
none of them explicitly included uncertainty in the picture. Our work lls this gap by in-
troducing two sources of uncertainty into the analysis: event uncertainty i.e. the uncertain
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Figure 2.23: Damage Coe¢ cient Re-shu­ ing: Percentage Change of the Optimal Adapta-
tion Investment under Spatial Uncertainty w.r.t. Certainty Case
occurrence of a climate catastrophe triggered by temperature increase, and spatial uncer-
tainty i.e. an imperfect knowledge on the geographic distribution of the climatic damage.
We show that in both cases uncertainty works in the direction to make mitigation a more
advantageous strategy over adaptation, but because of di¤erent causes.
When event uncertainty is concerned mitigation becomes relatively more important than
adaptation because it helps to reduce temperature increase through reducing carbon emis-
sion and hence the probability of the occurrence of the event. Adaptation has no impact
on this. Therefore, the optimal mitigation rate is increased under the event uncertainty,
while the adaptation investment behaves insensitively. Actually the higher mitigation e¤ort
moderately decreases adaptation investment. Mitigation and adaptation remain economic
substitutes under event uncertainty: more adaptation decreases the need to mitigate and
more mitigation that to adapt. However, the crowding-out e¤ect of adaptation to mitiga-
tion is weaker if compared to that in the certainty case, and of mitigation to adaptation
is stronger. The results also show that the optimal mitigation responses are much less
sensitive than adaptation responses to spatial uncertainty. While mitigation responds to
global damage, adaptation functions to curb the regional-specic damages. Therefore, if the
damage distribution is uncertain, mitigation which can e¤ectively reduce the global climate
risks helps policy makers commit fewer mistakes than adaptation. The consequence is that
mitigation decisions under spatial uncertainty are much more stable than those related to
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adaptation.
These results have important policy implications: in a world with climate-related catastrophic
event uncertainty mitigation becomes the key policy variable as it is the only strategy able
to reduce the probability of the catastrophic outcomes. As a consequence mitigation should
be decided following precautionary considerations in the presence of discontinuity and irre-
versibility, and it should not, or not only at least, follows the standard cost benet analyses
performed in a smooth/continuous damage context. Then adaptation can be deployed to
tackle the residual damage not accommodated by mitigation. Investing on mitigation has
another advantage: considering the di¢ culty to assess ex-ante the economic dimension of
region-specic damages, it endows the policy decision maker with a tool which is more ro-
bust to uncertainty than adaptation. Therefore the policy decision maker can be condent
that by mitigating the probability of a planning mistake is somewhat smaller. All what
said obviously applies in the context of a global policy which aims to internalize climate
externalities. In a non-cooperative world adaptation will remain the preferred strategy.
Chapter 3
REDUCING UNCERTAINTY: THE EFFECT OF LEARNING ON
CLIMATE POLICIES
Abstract
Climate policy is signicantly impacted by various sources of uncertainty. The possible
reduction of uncertainty, a step further, also imposes e¤ects on the policy implementation.
Groups of papers have been studying passive learning, i.e. reducing uncertainty through
the observation of relevant outcomes and then updating knowledge accordingly, and its role
in policy choice. However, theoretically speaking it is also possible to learn in an active
way, that is, to reduce uncertainty by investing in the learning activities. So far active
learning has not well-explored by the literatures. This chapter lls the gap between the
theoretical possibility and the modeling exercise regarding active learning. We stick to the
uncertainty of catastrophic happening and try to nd the e¤ect of learning catastrophic
sensitivity (a parameter bridging temperature increase and occurrence of catastrophes) on
policy decision. A two-stage sequential learning module is added to the modied version
of RICE to approximate the policy making process with the knowledge updating, which is
achieved by the investment in learning activities. The modeling exercise shows although
it crowds out other investment option, the learning investment is worthwhile in improving
knowledge and controlling climate damage by choosing more benecial policies. The e¤ect
on policy decision is inuenced by the productivity of learning, i.e. learning rate. A higher
learning rate implies an earlier arrival of information, thus more quickly the policy choice
approaches to the optimal.
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3.1 Introduction and Background
Uncertainty has become an important and widely-recognized topic in the economics of
climate change. A volume of literature in this area explored the e¤ect of learning in reducing
this uncertainty (see e.g. Kelly and Kolstad, 1999, Karp and Zhang, 2001, Leach, 2005,
Webster et al., 2008 etc.). This dimension enriches the analysis of climate change policy
because uncertainty itself becomes uncertainand possible to change. As time passes, more
evidence about climate change will be revealed through observation; some actions may also
be adopted to actively improve the knowledge through education and R&D programs. In
either way, policy makers in the future will be more informed about the problems than
policy makers today. Therefore, the climate policies might be more e¢ ciently designed if
they are planned according to the improved information.
Theoretical and empirical researches on learning are mainly trying to answer three ques-
tions: does information have any value? (Peck and Teisberg, 1993; Nordhaus, 1994; Bosello
and Moretto, 1998) Due to the large uncertainty and the irreversibility in the context of
climate change, is it worthwhile to wait for more knowledge in order to make the correct
decision? (Arrow and Fisher, 1974; Henry, 1974; Freixas and La¤ont, 1984; Ulph and Ulph,
1997) How to build up a framework for policy study, taking into account the e¤ect of learn-
ing? (Kelly and Kolstad, 1999; Castelnuovo et al., 2001; Karp and Zhang, 2001; Webster,
2002; Webster et al., 2008) The main results of these studies rstly quantify a positive value
of information. It depends on the source of uncertainty, the di¤erent model settings, the
way in which information is acquired and the time when the uncertainty can be reduced.
Peck and Teisberg (1993) showed that the earlier learning takes place, the higher is the
value of information; it could amount to $56 billion for a learning anticipating knowledge
by eight year. Bosello and Moretto (1998) estimated that the value of learning about cli-
matic catastrophic events. It could vary from $16.9 billion to $465.1 billion under di¤erent
modeling frameworks. Secondly, there are two kinds of counterbalancing irreversibility that
could impact the climate change policy problem (Kolstad, 1996a): one referring to climate
dynamics that cannot be reverted in practice, the other connected to the sunk cost of policy
implementation. Whether it is optimal to wait for more information before making deci-
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sions depends on which irreversibility prevails. If the economic irreversibility is stronger
wait and then learn is a better strategy. The third question, analyzing policy making under
uncertainty and learning, can be answered by following two approaches: active learning and
passive learning1. Active learning assumes that new information comes because of a ded-
icated investment in knowledge improvement; while passive learning assumes a sequential
update of knowledge driven by simple observation. Until now passive learning has been the
dominant approach. At rst, passive learning was incorporated to study the value of infor-
mation, and the information was assumed to arrive without any cost (Nordhaus and Popp,
1997). More recently, Bayesian statistics is introduced to represent a mechanism through
which the knowledge updates by the observation of some relevant signals. A typical pa-
rameter to which passive learning is applied is climate sensitivity (CS) (see e.g. Kelly and
Kolstad, 1999; Leach, 2005; Webster et al., 2008). CS functions as a link between GHG
concentration and temperature increase. Therefore, the sequential observation of the GHG
concentration and the temperature at the end of each period can be treated as the signal
to update the knowledge about CS for the next period. Given that the stronger the signal
is the faster the learning takes place, a paradoxical result is that in order to acquire more
information, it is benecial to emit more (control less). To control emission and to acquire
more information constitute thus a pair of contradictory instances (Kelly and Kolstad, 1999;
Webster et al., 2008). On top of that, Bayesian approach has other shortcomings and to
some extent complicates the problem even more2. On the other hands, active learning so
far has not been developed by the empirical modeling literature.
In the second chapter uncertain catastrophic events and the policy responses to them
have been discussed. In addition to the temperature level, the probability of the catastrophic
outcome depends on the sensitivity of the climatic system in triggering such a catastrophe
given certain level of temperature increase. This concept is embedded in the parameter '
of the catastrophic probability function. It can be considered a catastrophic sensitivity
parameter and named as such hereafter. This parameter has been calibrated according to
1For the precise denition, see Chapter 1.
2Refers to the Chapter 1 for the details.
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the latest scientic evidence. However, there is still a huge uncertainty on this. As the
research work on climate change continues, more information will be gained. How much
should policy makers spend for the climate change research? Is the investment on those
activities worthwhile? How is the learning activity able to a¤ect the policy choice under the
catastrophic risks? How is the balance between mitigation and adaptation likely to change?
An exercise trying to shed light on these points will be interesting. Trying to avoid the
shortcoming coupled with the Bayesian modeling approach, modeling active learning and
its e¤ect could be quite illuminative.
This chapter is going to provide insights about the e¤ect of learning on climate policies
when facing catastrophic risks. Furthermore, additional exercise is also conducted about the
productivity of learning investment and how the di¤erent levels of productivity inuence the
decision making. To model active learning, ideas are borrowed from the literatures on in-
duced innovation and R&D activities. In these literatures (Nordhaus, 2002; Papineau, 2006;
Yu et al., 2009) R&D investment are made to help reduce the cost of technology, increase
total factor productivity and indirectly the GDP growth. Similarly, learning investment in
this exercise, e.g. on research program targeted at climate change, helps to improve the
knowledge (or reduce the mistake) about the probability of the catastrophic event. The
modied RICE framework is employed as Chapter 2, with learning module incorporated.
Section 2 describes the model and its calibration to incorporate learning activities through
investment. Section 3 displays the main results about the learning e¤ect on policy choice,
and further explores the learning e¤ect under di¤erent circumstances through the sensitivity
analysis. Section 4 provides the concluding remarks.
3.2 Modeling and Calibration
3.2.1 Modeling the Optimal Learning Path
The analytical framework used here to study learning e¤ects is a further development of the
model employed in Chapter 2. A learning module is embedded to describe how a dedicated
investment is able to improve the knowledge about the true value of the catastrophic sensi-
tivity. Initially policy makers have an idea about the catastrophic sensitivity, demonstrated
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by parameter '0, which is di¤erent from the true knowledge '
. This kind of knowledge is
updated over time, denoted by '(t), through the accumulation of learning investment. We
assume that the more capital is invested in learning, the closer will '(t) be to '. To sim-
plify, we assume that ' is higher than '0. '0 is the value consistent with the lower bound
of catastrophic probability given by the literature (4% for a doubling CO2 concentration),
while ' is consistent with its upper bound (75%, the highest probability estimated by Ar-
nell et al., 2005 for the collapse of THC). Besides, we also assume that catastrophic events
will totally destroy the whole society, i.e. the post-catastrophic damage will decrease the
utility to zero. The more policy makers invest on learning, the less the mistake they make,
measured by the di¤erence between the true state ' and '(t): '(t) = '   '(t), where
'(0) = '   '(0) . The smaller the di¤erence, the closer their mitigation and adaptation
strategies are to the optimal ones and the higher the utility. However investment in learning
entails also a cost: it might crowds out other investment options in the budget constraint
function.
The e¤ect of learning on reducing '(t) is modeled by a learning curve, which resembles
the experience curved explored rstly by Wright (1936) and recently applied to the energy
and environmental sectors by e.g. Papineau (2006), Yu et al. (2009). The curve follows
equation (3.1) saying that 1% increase of the learning index X(t) brings about jj% of
knowledge improving (mistake reduction),  < 0 (Yu et al., 2009).
'(t) = '(0) X(t) (3.1)
Learning index X(t), if put it in the context of learning-by-doing, was usually conceptu-
alized as experience, demonstrated by the index related to the production or cumulative
capacity at time t; while in our setting, it is driven by the learning investment so we con-
struct the index related to the cumulative learning capital made so far until time t SIL(t).
X(t) = 1 + SIL(t) (3.2)
Combining (3.1) and (3.2) together, we get the benet of learning, described by the
reduction of the mistakes equation (3.3). But practically the e¤ective benet of learning is
51
to have a higher utility when the policy portfolio, beneted by more information, is closer
to the optimal one.
'   '(t) = ('   '0)  [(1 + SIL(t)] (3.3)
Accordingly when the learning capital stock is zero, '(t) = '0 while when the capital
stock goes to innity, '(t) = '.
The cost of learning is represented by learning investment IL(n; t), competing with
physical capital investment, adaptation investment, mitigation expenditure and consump-
tion in the income budget constraint. Following Nordhaus (2002) the opportunity cost of
research activities in the environmental sector is set 4 times higher than other investment3.
Therefore, the income budget constraint is now written as
YN (n; t) = C(n; t) + I(n; t) + IA(n; t) + 4  IL(n; t) (3.4)
The accumulation of learning investment, which decides the learning curve, is
SIL(t) =
nX
[KL(n; t  1)  (1  ) + IL(n; t)] (3.5)
(3.4) and (3.5) describe how learning accumulates. (3.3) (3.5) build up the learning
module that can be added into the basic framework of climate policy analysis employed in
Chapter 2. The complete model is displayed completely in Appendix C.
3.2.2 Modeling Sequential Decision Making
The learning module above describes how the learning investment functions to improve
the knowledge about the true state of the world. A technical problem is that by building
up such a framework we are working with a perfect foresighted model. This implies that
the decision made even at the rst period is based also on the knowledge which will be
got in all the subsequent periods. This of course is not consistent to what happens in the
real world where decisions in every period can be based only on the knowledge e¤ectively
3See Nordhaus (2002) for the details.
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at hand. More specically, considering the uncertain parameter ', the decision about
mitigation, adaptation and physical investment at time T can only be made according to
the knowledge got updated so far, '(T ). Therefore, we develop a sequential mechanism to
mimic the decision making along with the process of knowledge updating. We follow here
a two-stage approach to approximate this mechanism. To start the process, at the rst
stage a simulation is run producing an optimal learning path together with optimal path
for all the decision variables throughout the whole simulation period. At the second stage
the optimal learning investment and the updated value of '(t) for period 1 are stored as
independent variables, and then the model repeats an optimization simulation from period
2 onward. This process is thus repeated t times. The number of iterations is consistent with
the number of time periods. At each iteration, for example, the T th, aggregated utility is
maximized with the learning activity that takes place only before and at time T . In this way,
all the policy variables follow the rule shown below, that is, Suppose that knowledge has
been updated until time T , all the policy variables, generalized as V ar(n; t), are substituted
with
V ar(n; t) =

V ar(n; t) when t  T
V arlevel(n; t) when t < T

V arlevel(n; t) are the variables stored from the last iteration and used in the next as
independent variables.
The sequential decision making process, which is the second stage of the mechanism
explained above, is illustrated by Fig.3.1. Policy makers decide the policy variables at time
T . TS stands for the iteration index, numerically it equals to t. To avoid index complexity,
the regional index n is omitted. Learning investment IL(t) is decided at the rst stage. Thus
the stock of learning investment at the rst period SIL(1) and '(1);the knowledge updated
by investing in learning in the rst period, are given as independent variables to maximize
the aggregated utility in Iteration 1 (TS=1). The policy variables derived from Iteration 1
become the independent variables for Iteration 2, aggregated utility is maximized again to
get the policy variables for Iteration 3 and so forth. The algorithm terminates when the
number of the iteration exceeds the maximum time period.
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Figure 3.1: Algorithm of Sequential Decision Making Process
3.2.3 Calibrating the Learning Module
In the learning module, two parameters need to be estimated, the parameter  that decides
the shape of the learning index X(t) and  that decides the learning rate (LR), which
implies the speed of learning. Two benchmarks are followed for the calibration.
First of all, empirical studies like IEA (2000) and Papineau (2006) dened LR as the
percentage of cost reduction given the doubling of learning index. Here we follow this
denition, and dene LR as the mistake reduction when learning index X(t) doubles. Thus
LR is derived from eqn.(3.1) and written as 1   2. Those literatures estimated that LR
should be within the range of 5%  35%; and  is calibrated here to t this benchmark.
Secondly, there has been no literature so far dening the e¤ect of learning climate change
on mistake reduction in terms of policy making. So in order to calibrate  we choose as
reference the e¤ect of education expenditures on economic growth. The recent studies give
the empirical evidence of this e¤ect, that 1% increase of education investment brings about
GDP growth by 0:03%   0:23% (Sequeria and Martins, 2008; Beraldo et al., 2009). Here
we benchmark our calibration within this range too and choose  to t it.
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Catastrophic Outcome   Mistake Reduction by 1% Increase of Learning Investment
25% Loss 0.8 -0.62 0.258%
50% Loss 0.3 -0.62 0.038%
100% Loss 0.3 -0.32 0.031%
Table 3.1: Calibration of the Learning Model: under Di¤erent Catastrophic Outcomes
If di¤erent levels of post-catastrophic outcome are assumed, the model needs to be
recalibrated to t the two benchmarks given above as  and  are both baseline dependent.
Table 3.1 shows the parameters  and  calibrated for the cases of 100% loss, 50% loss and
25% loss, and also the e¤ect of learning in terms of the mistake reduction. Note that under
the scenario of 25% losses, compared to the other two, the learning e¤ect displayed in the
last column is much more signicant (It is even slightly higher than the upper bound of the
benchmark, therefore, in the main analsis conducted below, we will not stick to 25% loss
scenario). It is because that the lower the catastrophic damage is, the less learning is needed
in order to make the optimal policy and to avoid those damages. Thus the thresholdby
which learning starts to take e¤ect is higher for lower damage scenario than the higher. In
another word, the lower the catastrophic damage is, the more e¤ective learning investment
must be.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Learning Investment
Based on the calibration above, Fig.3.2 shows the learning investment under the three
catastrophic damage scenarios: respectively with the catastrophic loss of 100%; 50% and
25% of GDP. The learning investment ranges from 0:56% to 3:5% of GDP at the end of the
century.
Recent literaturesprojections of optimal total R&D expenditure over GDP in the con-
text of applied endogenous growth models are around 2:5% in 2100 (Nicita, et al., 2009;
Massetti and Nicita, 2010). Our estimation of learning investments is lower than these
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Figure 3.2: Optimal Learning Investments
values when the post-catastrophic damages are 50% or 25% of GDP. However this amount
is quite high considering that the learning activity here only refers to the research, educa-
tion and other expenditure related to climate change. For the case of 100% damages, the
amount of investment dedicated to learning is far much higher than what is now presented
in the existing literatures, which apparently did not take into account the possibility of total
economic collapse.
What our simulation also suggests is that it would be worth to wait until 2030 to invest
in climatic knowledge, and even later if the catastrophic damage is lower. As mentioned in
the model description, learning benets the utility under imperfect knowledge to approach
the maximum under the full knowledge. Therefore, learning occurs whenever the utility is
lower than the maximum. Due to the maximization of the aggregated utility over time,
the temporal utility, however, is possible to be lower for the optimal case than the case
under imperfect knowledge at least in the rst several decades. For example, under the
case of 100% damages, temporal utility only catches up at 2020, when it stays equal to
the imperfect case. Therefore, learning takes place only at 2030, when the temporal utility
starts to exceed.
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2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
Learning Investment
(% of GDP)
0 0 0 0.15% 0.58% 1.04% 1.52% 1.97% 2.38% 2.76% 3.09%
Mistake (% Di¤er-
ence between '(t)
and ')
100% 100% 100% 100% 92.92% 76.16% 63.01% 53.52% 46.77% 41.72% 37.82%
Table 3.2: E¤ect of Learning on Mistake Reduction
3.3.2 The E¤ect of Learning
Hereafter, we stick to the case where catastrophic events bring the social utility down to zero
(catastrophic damage is 100% losses of GDP) to look into the e¤ect of learning. Dynamics
are clearer in this case, and the results can be more easily to show comparing to the other
two. The investment in learning takes e¤ect on improving knowledge, and consequently
helps to make more benecial climate policy to reduce more climate damges.
Table 3.2 shows the e¤ect of learning on knowledge improvement given the optimal
learning investment. At the end of the century, the mistake will be reduced by 38%.
The benet of those learning investment in terms of climatic damage reduction can be
demonstrated by Figure 3.3. The reduction of residual damage is calculated by the per-
centage di¤erence between the damage control under false knowledge and that under the
updated knowledge. The lower the mistake is the more damage is controlled through a more
benecial policy portfolio. This point can be further illustrated by Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5,
where the climate policies are compared among the cases (a) under the perfect knowledge
 true stateof-the-world (TrueSOW ), (b) under the false-knowledge (FalseKnw) and (c)
learning takes place (Learning). The policies under these three knowledge levels are here-
after mentioned as optimal path, wrong path and learning path. Following the wrong path,
with the recognition that catastrophic events are less likely to happen, the policy choice is
more optimistic lower mitigation rate and higher adaptation expenditure the results we
have already shown in Chapter 2. As knowledge is updated, policy makers realize that the
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state of the world is more pessimistic than previously expected. The policy portfolio should
be tilted to mitigation to prevent the catastrophic happening. However, since the knowl-
edge is sequentially updated decision makers can only adjust the policy gradually according
to the information they have at hand. So an approach gradually being conicident to the
optimal path is shown in the gures.
Figure 3.3: Benet of Learning
Learning shifts the policy balance towards the direction that is consistent to the optimal
path, but the adjustments of the two policies to the new balance follow di¤erent approaches.
In Fig.3.4, the optimal mitigation rate with learning coincides with that under perfect
information in 2060 when the knowledge about the catastrophic sensitivity is still 50%
incomplete; moreover, an over-control occurs by 0:5%  0:8% higher than the optimal path
after 2060. This over-control behaviour helps to o¤set the previous excess emission (relative
to the optimal path) due to the imperfect information. These trends however are not
observed in the case of adaptation. As explained before, as far as policy makers realize
that the knowledge they held previously was too optimistic, more stringent emission is
implemented to compensate the losses caused by the insu¢ cient mitigation e¤ort. Therefore,
as knowledge is updated, even if it is not fully improved to the perfect, mitigation rate roars
up to catch up with the optimal path. In another word, the catastrophic penalization
is enough to justify a very aggressive mitigation strategy. This compensation mechanism
does not happen in the case of adaptation; the optimal adaptation investment is adjusted
58
following a smooth path, with every step of knowledge update. As a result, mitigation
reacts more quickly than adaptation to approach to the optimal path.
Figure 3.4: Mitigation Rate under Di¤erent Knowledge Levels
Figure 3.5: Adaptation Investment under Di¤erent Knowledge Levels
Learning takes place crowding out also other expenditures in the budget constraint.
Figure 3.6 displays the comparison of physical investment before and after learning is in-
troduced. It shows that the crowding out e¤ect of learning investment on the physical
investment does exist. At the end of the century, physical investment (calculated by the
percentage of GDP) will be reduced by 13%.
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Figure 3.6: Crowding out Physical Investment
3.3.3 Sensitivity on the Learning Rate
Learning rate, dened as the percentage improvement of the knowledge by doubling the
learning index, measures the productivity and the speed of learning. How e¢ cient and how
fast learning investment take e¤ect inuence the climate policies in the sense of timing and
amount. Here we set ve LRs according to its range given by literatures, 5%; 10%; 20%; 30%; 35%:
Intuitively the higher the LR is the more productive learning could be. Figure 3.7 displays
the benet of learning under di¤erent LRs, demonstrated by the percentage reduction of
the discounted & accumulated damage all over the century. Again the benet of learning
investment is given by the percentage reduction of residual damage compared to the case
with wrong knowledge. Fig.3.7 shows that more e¤ective learning investments brings about
more damage reduction. A decreasing return to scale can also be found with respect to
the learning rate. A higher LR induces higher motivation to invest in learning, however,
theoretically speaking, at each level of LR, when the learning investment beyond certain
threshold the updated knowledge becomes close to the perfect information. After that the
continuously increasing investment will not bring about the benet as much as the initial
incremental capitals.
This thresholde¤ect further functions for policy responses. Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9
show the mitigation rate and adaptation investment corresponding to di¤erent LRs.
Of both mitigation rate and adaptation investment, more productive learning induces
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Figure 3.7: Benet of Learning under Di¤erent LRs
Figure 3.8: Mitigation Rate under Di¤erent LRs
the earlier arrival of the information, therefore the learning path approaches faster to the
optimal path as LR increases. However, the change of the policy response is not linear to
LR. Due to the decreasing return to scale, within the range of LR we gave from 5% to 35%,
the rst 5% increase (from 5% to 10%) induces stronger e¤ect on both policies than the last
5% (from 30% to 35%). Particularly for the mitigation rate, the lower LR shows a higher
over-control rate after the learning path crosses over the optimal path. The knowledge
is updated more slowly, thus compared to the higher level of LR, lower LR allows more
emission due to the under-estimation of the catastrophic risks; after more information is
acquired, more damage need to be o¤set by a more strict mitigation policy. The highest
over-control rate, relative to the optimal path, is listed in Table 3.3. It happens later to
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Figure 3.9: Adaptation Investments under Di¤erent LRs
LR Over-Control Rate Time
5% 1.2289% 2080
10% 0.9742% 2080
20% 0.8993% 2080
30% 0.7400% 2090
35% 0.6541% 2090
Table 3.3: The Highest Over-Control Rates of Mitigation
the lower LR than the higher LR due to the slower knowledge improvement, but the rate is
higher.
3.3.4 Far-sighted and Myopic Policy Making
As a conclusion, it could be interesting to see, just for demonstrative purposes, what a far-
sighted policy decision-maker would do. By far-sighted we mean a decision maker able to
exploit since the beginning all the information available along all the simulation period. In
another word, even though information update starts since 2030, it is embedded in the plan
that starts since 2010. In fact this is the problem we had to overcome in order to simulate a
more realistic policy making process, but we can draw some conclusion comparing the two
behaviors of policy making.
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Fig.3.10 shows the mitigation e¤ort in far-sighted plan. Compared with the myopic plan
in Fig.3.4, mitigation e¤ort in the beginning of the century has already been strengthened
and the learning path approaches faster to the optimal path. The far-sighted policy maker
takes into todays consideration the knowledge update in the future, which in this case
indicates that the true state of the world is expected to be more pessimistic than what
is understood nowadays. In addition, the over-control rate in the far-sighted plan is even
higher than the myopic plan, by around 2% at the end of the century, moreover it happens
earlier by three decades. It is true that with higher mitigation rate less losses are caused
in the far-sighted case. But the knowledge is still imperfect and the di¤erence between the
far-sighted and myopic policy makers is that their expectation of the future knowledge is
di¤erent. The one who realizes earlier that the knowledge at present is too optimistic will
adopt the more strict and earlier preventive policy.
The scale of adaptation investment, on the other hand shrinks for the far-sighted policy
makers than the myopic ones as if more resources would are shifted to mitigation to alleviate
the catastrophic risks.
Figure 3.10: Mitigation Rate in a Far-sighted Plan
Last but not the least, the more benecial policy portfolio makes the learning path closer
to the optimal path, hence brings about higher level of the utility, as Fig. 3.12 displays the
utility comparison between the myopic and the far-sighted.
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Figure 3.11: Adaptation Investment in a Far-sighted Plan
Figure 3.12: Utility Comparison: Far-sighted .vs. Myopic
3.4 Concluding Remarks
The possibility to reduce uncertainty adds another dimension to the economics of climate
change. In a more dynamic environment, climate policy under uncertainty also takes into
account the change of the uncertainty itself. Apart from the observation and the statis-
tic approach, investing in research activities is another way to update knowledge and get
closer to the perfect information. This chapter tries to incorporate those activities into the
climate-economy integrated framework and study the e¤ect of active learning on the policy
choice when facing catastrophic risks. A parametric uncertainty, catastrophic sensitivity,
is assumed to be reduced when research on climate change is carried on. A sequential
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decision-making mechanism is developed to simulate a more realistic policy making process.
The exercise shows that learning investments helps to reduce the climatic damages since
the policies will be made under the improving knowledge in this eld. The optimal learning
investment, considering about the wide range of the assumption of catastrophic outcome,
accounts for 0:56%   3:4% of GDP at the end of the century. The proportion learning
investment takes in the budget plan is inuenced by the outcome of the catastrophic event.
If the total economic collapse is expected, the research investments on climate change alone
even exceed the current projection of the R&D expenditure in 2100. Mitigation and adap-
tation are adjusted to compose a more benecial policy portfolio if learning takes place.
Both of them are following the path gradually approaching the optimal path that is under
the perfect information, as learning keeps on carrying on. But the two policies are not
adjusted synchronous in that mitigation reacts more quickly than adaptation to the new-
arrived information. In addition, mitigation rate will experience an over-controlto o¤set
the damage caused by the less stringent emission control policy before enough information
is gained. The learning investment crowds out the physical investment in the budget plan.
By sensitivity analysis, we also show that learning rate, a parameter that decides the
productivity of learning, a¤ects the speed in which policy choices converge to the optimal
path. The higher the learning rate is, the more quickly the knowledge can be updated,
and the faster the convergence can happen. In particular, the over-control rate of emission
is higher for the lower learning rate to o¤set more damages caused before, but the over-
control occurs later due to the slower knowledge improvement. In addition, the exercise
also shows a decreasing return to scale of learning rate in terms of damage reduction.
Analogously, as the learning rate increases, the learning e¤ect on policy choices is weakened
since information arrives earlier and the benet of learning is exhaustedearlier too. The
exercise also compares the di¤erent types of policy makers, who are able to make decision
in a far-sighted way or myopic way. By implementing a stricter mitigation plan, far-sighted
policy makers are able to benet the society with higher utility than the myopic ones.
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Appendix A
POLICY CHOICE UNDER THE UNCERTAINTY OF
CATASTROPHIC EVENT: A THEORETICAL MODEL
In the theoretical model developed by Ingham et al. (2005), the probability of the
catastrophic happening is related to the risk parameter and the mitigation e¤ort. The higher
the mitigation rate or the higher the risk, the more probable the catastrophic event will be
materialized. They also assumed that the damage function is dependent on the adaptive
action alone. However, there are two points missing in their assumptions if a more complete
picture of the issue is required. First of all, since catastrophic damage happens only under
certain probability, it is also possible that the damage happens only in the regular basis. This
means that compared to the huge/discontinuous outcomes, climate change also causes the
small, continuous damage that is not negligible. Secondly, mitigation, functions to reduce
the GHG emissions, takes e¤ect not only on the probability of catastrophic happenings but
also on the damage reduction. Therefore, here we include these two additional assumptions
in Ingham et al. (2005b)s framework and further check the results about (1) the relationship
between the two strategies; (2) the e¤ect of uncertain catastrophic event on the policy choice.
Proposition 1 Mitigation and adaptation are substitutes with the presence of the endoge-
nous uncertainty of catastrophic events.
Proof. Referring to Ingham et al. (2005), the endogenous uncertainty of catastrophic
events can be modeled by including the probability of the catastrophic happenings in the
cost minimization problem. But with two additional assumptions, our model includes the
regular damage, which is proportional to the catastrophic damage following the denition
of catastrophic events given by Nordhaus (1994b); we also assume that damage is not only
controlled by adaptation but also mitigation. The minimization problem is as:
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min
fm;ag
(;m)  1:25 D(m;a) + (1  (;m)) D(m;a) +M(m) + A(a) (A1.1)
where m and a represent the mitigation and adaptation investment; M and A are the
cost of the policies.  is the positive parameter of the cost function of adaptation. D is
the damage of climate change, which can be reduced through mitigation and/or adaptation.
According to the denition of the catastrophic losses by Nordhaus (1994b), when catastrophe
occurs, 25% of output will be lost - since the damage is proportional to the output, the
post-catastrophic damage is 1:25 times of the regular damage su¤ered from climate change
D. Here we take advantage of this setting.  is the probability of the occurrence of the
catastrophic event, which is triggered by the GHG stocks in the atmosphere and hence
inuenced by the mitigation policy.  depends on the positive parameter . The objective
function above satises the condition as follows:
@D
@m
= D1< 0;
@D
@a
= D2< 0 (A1.1-1)
D11 > 0;D22> 0 (A1.1-2)
D12 = D21 0 (A1.1-3)
D11  D12;D22 D12 (A1.1-4)
@
@
= 1> 0;
@
@m
= 2< 0 (A1.1-5)
12 = 21 0 (A1.1-6)
22  0 (A1.1-7)
M 0 > 0;M 00> 0;A0> 0;A00> 0 (A1.1-8)
(A1.1-1) - (A1.1-4) are all conditions about the damage function, the value of which de-
creases when mitigation or adaptation is implemented, but the e¤ect is diminishing. The
own e¤ect of either strategy alone is stronger than the cross e¤ects of the two strategies.
(A1.1-5) - (A1.1-7) are conditions about the probability of the catastrophic occurrence,
which depends on the parameter . Mitigation decreases the risk of catastrophes but the
e¤ect is diminishing. (A1.1-8) is the properties of the cost function w.r.t. mitigation and
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adaptation. These conditions except (A1.1-7) are following Ingham et al.(2005).To minimize
the cost function (A1.1), the following rst order conditions should be satised:
1:252D + 1:25D1 2D + (1  )D1+M 0= 0 (A1.2)
1:25D2+(1  )D2+A0= 0 (A1.3)
The relationship between mitigation and adaptation can be derived by conducting the com-
parative static analyses for mitigation and adaptation with respect to the adaptation cost.
Di¤erentiating (A1.2) and (A1.3) with respect to  we get:
G1
@m
@
+G2
@a
@
= 0 (A1.3)
G2
@m
@
+G3
@a
@
+A0= 0 (A1.5)
It is easy to get that
@a
@
=   1

G1A
0 (A1.6)
@m
@
=
1

G2A
0 (A1.7)
where
G1= 0:2522D + 0:52D1+D11+0:25D11+M
00;
G2 = 0:252D2+0:25D12+D12;
G3 = D22 + 0:25D22 + A
00;
 = G3G1 G22: Un-
der the same assumption as Ingham et al. (2005) that the cross e¤ects is negligible, i.e.
2D2 = 0, it is easy to nd that G1 > G2 > 0 and G3 > G2 > 0, so that  > 0.
Proposition 2 With the presence of the endogenous event uncertainty, i.e. the occurrence
of the catastrophic event is a¤ected by GHG emissions, the optimal level of adaptation
investment is non-increasing with the catastrophic risk while the optimal level of mitigation
is non-decreasing.
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Proof. We conduct the comparative static analyses for mitigation and adaptation with
respect to the to the catastrophic risk. Di¤erentiating (A1.2) and (A1.3) with respect to
risk parameter  that a¤ect the probability of catastrophic happening, we get the following:
G1
@m
@
+G2
@a
@
=  0:25(1D1+21D) (A2.1)
G2
@m
@
+G3
@a
@
=  0:251D2 (A2.2)
Then it is easy to get the rst derivative of m and a with respect to  by (A2.1) and (A2.2):
@a
@
= 0:25 1

[1(G2D1  G1D2) + 12DG2] (A2.3)
Because 0 < G2 < G1 and D1  D2 < 0, which means that mitigation is more cost-
e¤ective than adaptation as far as the damage reduction is concerned (De Bruin et al.,
2007; Bosello,2008), it can be concluded that @a@  0. (A2.2) tells that
G1
@m
@
+G2
@a
@
=  0:25(1D1+21D) > 0 (A2.4)
It is easily to deducted that@m@ > 0. When facing the uncertainty of catastrophic events,
mitigation is enhanced but adaptation is unchanged even reduced
From the above, it shows that the two strategies are substitution, and the increased
probability of catastrophic event will increase the investment on mitigation. Due to the
substitution, the increase of the investment on one strategy cut down the other, so the
increase of the mitigation investment decreases the adaptation investment.
Since the two strategies are substitution, to decide which one is more benecial in dealing
with the uncertain catastrophic happenings helps to see the e¤ect of uncertainty on policy
choice. By reducing GHG emissions and controlling the temperature increase, mitigation
reduces the probability of a catastrophic outcome. Adaptation, on the other hand, can act
only on the damage once materialized. Thus it can be expected that facing the possible
occurrence of catastrophic event, mitigation becomes more radical and more mitigation
e¤ort should be paid. Due to the relationship of substitution, more mitigation also imply
less or at least unchanged adaptive action, considering about the e¤ect adaption also takes
in reducing damage.
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Appendix B
APPROACHES TO MODEL UNCERTAINTY IN IAM
To work with uncertainty in IAM framework means a three-step game: to know and
recognize uncertainty, to play with uncertainty, and to resolve uncertainty. The three ap-
proaches for uncertainty study are the methods that correspond to each step. Studies can
play either a single-step or multi-step game; hence some of them picked more than one
approach in one paper. Table B gives the comparison among several integrated studies
about methodologies and displays the selected ndings. Literatures are classied by these
three approaches. The method to conduct sensitivity analysis is similar across the existing
literatures, so only two early ones are selected to be listed. In the uncertainty propagation
approach, a series of papers are selected to represent di¤erent ways to quantify uncertainty.
The papers selected for the sequential decision making approach are sub-categorized into
the active learning and passive learning, the di¤erence of which is whether learning takes
place through some investment (R&D investment), which could take up part of the produc-
tion. More literatures have been following the passive learning path more precisely, no
studies so far have taken the active learning path to study the reduction of uncertainty and
the policy implication. The two papers quoted in the active learning rows both follow
the integrated assessment approach coupled with endogenous technical progress, but nei-
ther of them deal with uncertainty by taking advantage of the knowledge investment. By
quoting them we try to introduce a possible framework, which incorporates the module of
endogenous technical change and can be applied for active learning in the future (Peterson,
2006).
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Methodology Literature Quantifying Uncertainty Main Findings
Uncertainty
Propagation
Tol (1999) 1. Monte-Carlo simulation is
conducted for 1000 runs.
1. In the presence of uncer-
tainty, mitigation e¤ort is op-
timal to be higher.
2. The optimal emission path
is being searched for with and
without abatement policy s.t.
uncertainty.
2. Impact uncertainty has
stronger e¤ect and than the un-
certainty of policy cost.
Uncertainty
Propagation
Yohe (1996) 1. Characterize the
catastrophic event by
two uncertain parameters,
climate sensitivity and the
climatic damage.
1. Expected information value
will fall if the economic cost
of setting an incorrect policy is
small.
2. Subjective probabilities
are assigned accordingly to
the states of the world.
2. Relatively modest short-
term carbon abatement policy
could be adopted to hedging
against catastrophic event.
3. Expected, discounted
value of information is drawn
from the comparison between
the information got earlier
and later.
Uncertainty
Propagation
Bosello and
Moretto (1999)
["exogenous
uncertainty"
part]
1. A hazard rate function is
estimated to relate probabil-
ity of catastrophic event to
the temperature increase in
the same period.
1. Uncertainty of catastrophic
event pulls up the mitigation
rate.
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2. Expected utility over
the utility before and after
catastrophes is weighed by
the hazard rate.
2. The value of the dynamic in-
formation is justifed.
Sequential
Decision
Making
Bosello and
Moretto (1999)
["endogenous
uncertainty"
part]
1. In the hazard rate
function, the probability of
catastrophic event is related
not only to the temperature
increase in the same period,
but also the historical trend
of the temperature increase,
denoted by the rate of change
of the temperature.
3. RICE model shows the dif-
ferent reaction that less cau-
tious action is taken when fac-
ing catastrophic risks, and the
value of the dynamic informa-
tion is negative.
2. Value is estimated for the
dynamic information through
the comparison of utility un-
der endogenous uncertainty
and exogenous uncertainty.
Sequential
Decision
Making
(Active
Learning)
Castelnuovo et
al. (2001)
1. Quantify the endogenous
uncertainty using the same
way as Bosello and Moretto
(1998).
Uncertainty of catastrophic
event decreases the non-
environmentally-friendly
research investment and drives
down the price of the inter-
national carbon permit. The
e¤ect on the environmental
R&D is the opposite.
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2. Incorporate the hazard
function in the IAM with
learning investment for
knowledge accumulation.
The IAM also includes the
carbon permit demand to
model the international
carbon market.
3. Model is run to get the op-
timal policy choice.
Sequential
Decision
Making
(Active
Learning)
Nordhaus
(2002)
1. Uncertainty is not explic-
itly modeled but the improve-
ment of the knowledge is in-
corporated into DICE model
as the induced innovation
by the research investment,
which accounts for a propor-
tion of the production.
Induced innovation has small
impact on the overall climate
change path because the op-
timal learning investment ac-
counts for a small proportion of
production.
2. The innovation possibil-
ity frontier (IPF) is added
into the framework to de-
scribe how research invest-
ment improve the state of the
knowledge.
3. IAM is run with the inno-
vation function.
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Sequential
Decision
Making
(Passive
Learning)
Kelly and Kol-
stad (1999)
1. An uncertain parameter,
climate sensitivity, is treated
as a random variable with un-
known parameter in the dis-
tribution.
1. The speed of learning is sen-
sitivity to the noise in the tem-
perature realization, and the
noise can be reduced through
more GHG emission. So theres
a tradeo¤ between the speed of
learning and emission control.
2. The random variable has a
prior of certain distribution,
and Bayes Rule is applied
to update the prior consecu-
tively according to the tem-
perature and GHG concen-
tration observed in the same
period.
2. It is estimated that depend-
ing on the true value of the cli-
mate sensitivity, it needs longer
time to resolve uncertainty than
currently believed (90   160
years).
3. The model is run with the
random variable (under up-
dating) and gets the optimal
policy choice.
Sequential
Decision
Making
(Passive
Learning)
Karp and Zhang
(2001)
1. A parameter in the dam-
age function, as the slope
of marginal damage, is un-
known. Set it to be a ran-
dom variable with unknown
parameter in the prior distri-
bution.
1. Learning leads to a very
slight less stringent climate pol-
icy so the possibility to learn
should not be the reason to de-
lay the policy.
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2. Bayes Rule is applied
for the random variable up-
dated with the observed dam-
age and GHG concentration.
2. Learning can be a quick
process to get a parameter
value close to the true one.
3. 1&2 also applied for
the unknown abatement cost
shocks.
3. Tax is a better instrument
than quota, which is lack of in-
formative advantage.
4. Two policy instruments:
carbon tax and quota trade
are compared. With carbon
tax, a Bayesian regulator can
update the knowledge of the
abatement cost while quota
trade doesnt enable her so.
5. Optimal policy is drawn
through the saving cost max-
imization with the two un-
certain but updating parame-
ters.
6. E¤ect of learning is stud-
ied through the comparison of
the initial belief and the true
value.
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Sequential
Decision
Making
(Passive
Learning)
Leach (2007) 1. Set two uncertain parame-
ters in the temperature equa-
tion, climate sensitivity and
the inter-temporal coe¢ cient
of GHG concentration, each
to be a random variable with
prior containing unknown pa-
rameters.
1. When uncertainty is over
two causes of certain observa-
tions, learning time might be
extended to the order of cen-
tury or millennium.
2. Bayesian update takes
place through 1000 Monte-
Carlo runs for the two ran-
dom variables at the same
time.
2. The data of certain observa-
tion dont provide su¢ cient in-
formation to learn if two causes
are uncertain, using single set
of observation in this case can
lead signicant errors.
3. Compare the updated
process of climate sensitivity
under two uncertain parame-
ters and one.
Table B.1: Approach to Model Uncertainty in IAM
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Appendix C
STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL
VARIABLES
n : 1-5, regions, with reference to USA (the United States), EEC (the European Union), JPN
(Japan), CHN (China), FSU (Former Soviet Nations), ROW (Rest of the World);
t : 1-12, time scale, 10 years as a unit; from 1990 to 2010;
Parameters
! : utility weight for every regions;
R : discount rate;
 : elasticity of output with respect to the capital stocks;
b1; b2; b3 : parameters of the mitigation cost function;
a1; a2 : parameters of the damage function;
K : depreciation rate of capital stocks;
IA : depreciation rate of adaptation capital stocks;
c1; c2; c3; c4 : parameters of climatic equation;
 : feedback parameter in climatic equation
 : CO2 emission/GDP ratio
M : the removal rate of CO2 stocks in the atmosphere;
 : the retention rate of CO2 stocks in the atmosphere;
 : parameter #1 of the hazard rate function of the catastrophic occurrence
' : parameter #2 of the hazard rate function of the catastrophic occurrence
'0 : the initial value of the parameter #2 of the hazard rate function of the catastrophic
occurrence
' : the perfect knowledge about the parameter #2 of the hazard rate function of the catastrophic
occurrence
Exogenous Variables
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A : the Total Factor Productivity;
L : the population level;
Fo : the exogenous forces of the greenhouse gases other than CO2;
Endogenous Variables
U : aggregated utility level
YG : gross output (trillion dollars);
YN : net output (trillion dollars);

 : damage parameter;
C : consumption (trillion dollars);
I : capital investment (trillion dollars);
K : capital stocks (trillion dollars);
IA : adaptation investment (trillion dollars);
SAD : adaptation investment stocks (trillion dollars);
IL : learning investment (trillion dollars);
SIL : learning investment stocks (trillion dollars);
 : mitigation rate (0    1);
E : CO2 emission to the atmosphere (hundred million tons);
M : CO2 stocks in the atmosphere (hundred million tons);
T : atmospheric temperature (C);
To : oceanic temperature (C);
F : radiative force of the greenhouse gases in the atmosphere;
D : residual damage su¤ered from the climate change.
'(t) : knowledge improvement in terms of parameter #2 of the hazard rate function of the
catastrophic occurrence.
EQUATIONS
Aggregated Utility Equation
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U = P (t)
nX tX
f(1 +R)10(1 t)!(n)  L(n; t) log [0:75  C(n; t)=L(n; t)]g
+(1  P (t))
nX tX
f(1 +R)10(1 t)!(n)
L(n; t) log [C(n; t)=L(n; t)]g (C.1)
Economic Equations
YG(n; t) = A(n; t) K(n; t)L(n; t)1  (C.2)
YN (n; t) = Y G(n; t)  
 (C.3)

 = [1  b1(t)  b2(n)  (n; t)b3(n)]=
f1 + 1=[1 + SAD(n; t)1=2]  a1(n)  [T (t)=2:5]a2(n)g (C.4)
[No learning investment]
C(n; t) = Y N (n; t)  I(n; t)  IA(n; t) (C.5)
[With learning investment]
C(n; t) = Y N (n; t)  I(n; t)  IA(n; t)  4  IL(n; t) (C.6)
K(n; t) = (1  K) K(n; t  1) + IA(n; t) (C.7)
SAD(n; t) = (1  IA)  SAD(n; t  1) + IA(n; t) (C.8)
SIL(t) =
nX
[KL(n; t  1)  (1  ) + IL(n; t)] (C.9)
Learning Equation
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'   '(t) = ('   '0)  [(1 + SIL(t)] (C.10)
Climatic Equations
T (t) = T (t  1) + c1[F (t)  T (t)  c2(T (t)  T o(t))] (C.11)
F (t) = 4:1 ln(M(t)=590)
ln 2
+F o(t) (C.12)
E(n; t) = [1  (n; t)]  (n; t)  Y G(n; t) (C.13)
M(t+ 1) = 590 + 
nX
E(n; t) + (1 M)  (M(t)  590) (C.14)
Uncertainty Equation
P (t) = 1  e
 
TR
T (0)
'(TE(t) TE(0)) 1dTE
(C.15)
Damage Equation
D(n; t) = P (t)  0:25  YN (n; t) + (1  P (t)) A(n; t) K(n; t)  L(n; t)1 
f1  1=[1 + 1=(1 + SAD(n; t)1=2)  a1(n)  (T (t)=2:5)a2(n)]g (C.16)
